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The	latest	information	points	to	growing	dynamism	in	the	world	economy.	At 
the start of the year, global activity lost momentum as a result of the rise in COVID-19 
infections in numerous regions and the subsequent reinforcement of pandemic-
containment measures. However, since the final stretch of Q1 there has been a 
gradual strengthening in activity which, more recently, is estimated to have gained in 
intensity on the information available.
Nonetheless,	 the	 trends	 observed	 are	 notably	 uneven	 across	 the	 different	
areas.	The improvement has basically been in the advanced economies, against the 
background of progress in vaccination programmes. This has helped significantly 
contain infection figures and, above all, the severity of the health consequences of 
the pandemic, allowing restrictions to be eased. The upshot is a significant rebound 
in economic activity in Q2 in this group of countries (see Chart 1.1). Yet in many 
emerging economies, including some of the biggest, such as India, the incidence of 
the pandemic in recent months has been very high. Lockdown measures have, 
accordingly, been maintained or even stepped up in some cases.
In	 the	 short	 term,	 the	 contrast	 between	 the	 buoyancy	 of	 the	 advanced	
economies	and	the	greater	weakness	of	the	emerging	ones	is	even	likely	to	
heighten.	Given the current pace of vaccination, the advanced countries are likely 
to reach herd immunity before year-end. Conversely, the emerging economies’ 
vulnerability in the face of the pandemic will continue to be higher, given their limited 
capacity to accelerate the vaccination process.
From	a	sectoral	standpoint,	the	recent	increase	in	activity	would	appear	to	be	
concentrated	in	the	services	sectors.	The global services PMI has increased sharply 
and continuously since February, in step with the re-opening of the advanced economies 
(see Chart 1.2). Meantime, the global manufacturing PMI has held stable – albeit at high 
levels – since last autumn, consistent with the robust expansion in activity. The lack of 
further improvements since then probably reflects, in part, the disruption to global 
production chains that has begun to be felt in certain specific segments of the 
manufacturing sector. Where this phenomenon is notably manifest is in the lack of 
semiconductors, an input used in the production of several categories of goods. 
Commodities	price	rises	and	the	greater	buoyancy	of	economic	activity	are	
leading	 to	 greater	 inflationary	 pressures.	 In a setting in which the degree of 
cyclical slack appears to still be high, this quickening in prices should be transitory. 
It is believed to be linked, in part, to the above-mentioned disruption to productive 
processes.
1 OVERVIEW
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On	international	financial	markets,	the	brighter	outlook	for	global	activity	has,	
in	 recent	months,	 tended	 to	be	conducive	 to	 risk-appetite.	But, at the same 
time, the possibility that recent price rises may pave the way for more persistent 
increases in inflation has stirred fears of a potential tightening of monetary policies. 
In	 the	euro	area,	 the	 favourable	course	of	 the	pandemic	and	 the	across-the-
board	 improvements	 in	confidence	presage	a	strengthening	of	 the	pick-up	 in	
activity	in	the	immediate	future.	This favourable outlook rests on the assumption that 
there will be no fresh setbacks on the health front and, in particular, that the envisaged 
vaccination rollout will run to plan. Against this backdrop, private agents’ enhanced 
confidence, the increase in consumption (underpinned by a gradual decline in the 
saving rate), the rise in global demand and the support of economic policies should, on 
the latest Eurosystem projections presented to the ECB Governing Council on 10 June, 
provide for euro area GDP growth of 4.6% and 4.7% in 2021 and 2022, respectively. In 
both instances, that marks an upward revision of 0.6 pp on the March projections.1
Inflationary	pressures	in	the	euro	area	remain	modest.	The overall HICP indicator 
has risen quite sharply in recent months. This has been due to the energy component, 
affected by the base effects caused by the decline in oil prices in spring last year, at 
1 See the Eurosystem staff macroeconomic projections for the euro area, June 2021.
In 2021 to date, the gradual control of the pandemic in the advanced economies has led to a progressive recovery in activity. Conversely, in 
many emerging economies the rise in infections has meant that this group, on the whole, has performed much less dynamically. The recent 
improvement has been centred on services, these sectors having been more affected by the restrictions introduced to combat COVID-19.
DIVERGENCE IN GLOBAL RECOVERY, BY GEOGRAPHICAL REGION AND SECTOR
Chart 1
SOURCES: IHS Markit and Banco de España.
a The aggregate of the advanced economies excludes the euro area. The PMI data are for production.
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the onset of the pandemic. However, core inflation (which excludes the energy and 
food components) has held at very moderate levels and, although a rise is expected 
in the second half of the year, this will be on account of temporary factors which will 
foreseeably be reversed in 2022. On the latest Eurosystem projections, both the 
overall HICP and the core indicator are expected to post an annual average rate of 
1.4% in 2023. 
In	Spain,	the	conjunctural	information	available	also	suggests	a	notable	rise	in	
activity	in	Q2.	After output shrank in Q1, owing essentially to the stringency of the 
lockdown measures in force at the start of the year, the dynamism of the economy 
is estimated to have increased significantly (see Table 1 and Chart 2). Behind this 
momentum are the improvements in the qualitative indicators, the increase in 
effective Social Security registrations and the results of the third edition of the Banco 
de España survey on economic activity (EBAE by its Spanish acronym)2. Household 
spending is being boosted by improved confidence, against the backdrop of the 
significant scaling down of the pandemic-containment measures (especially 
following the end of the state of alert on 9 May) and the headway in the vaccination 
campaign. The improvement in external markets, as a result of the recovery in 
demand from the advanced economies as a whole and from China, is translating 
into an expansionary goods exports performance.
2 See M. Izquierdo (2021) "Encuesta a las empresas españolas sobre la evolución de su actividad (EBAE): tercera 
edición", Notas Económicas, Banco de España.
MAIN SPANISH MACROECONOMIC AGGREGATES (a)
Table 1
SOURCES: INE and Banco de España.
a Information available to 27 May 2021. The shaded figures are Banco de España projections under favourable, baseline and adverse scenarios.
b Contribution to the quarter-on-quarter rate of change of GDP, in percentage points.
2020 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1
National Accounts Favourable Baseline Adverse
Quarter-on-quarter rate of change, unless otherwise indicated
4.12.27.25.0-0.01.718.71-4.5-8.01-)PDG( tcudorp citsemod ssorG    
7.10.24.29.0-4.04.512.51-6.4-8.8-)b( dnamed lanoitan fo noitubirtnoC    
    Contribution of net external demand (b) -2.0 -0.8 -2.6 1.6 -0.4 0.4 0.3 0.2 -0.3
Year-on-year rate of change
1.529.523.626.3-1.6-4.6-0.52-3.4-4.01-dekrow sruoh :tnemyolpmE    
    Harmonised index of consumer prices (HICP) -0.3 0.7 -0.6 -0.6 -0.8 0.5 2.1 2.1 2.1
    Harmonised index of consumer prices excluding
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Looking	to	the	summer,	the	intensity	and	the	exact	timing	of	the	rise	in	activity	
continue	 to	hinge	crucially	on	 the	course	of	 the	pandemic,	progress	 in	 the	
vaccination	 campaign	 and	 the	 subsequent	 easing	 of	 the	 containment	
measures.	In particular, the recovery in tourism, so crucial for the Spanish economy, 
depends on the lifting of the restrictions still in place on people travelling between 
Spain and some of the main countries of origin of incoming tourists. A question mark 
currently hangs over any such lifting in the short term owing to the spread of more 
contagious strains of the virus.
The	baseline	scenario	of	 the	 latest	Banco	de	España	projections	envisages	
GDP	 growth	 of	 6.2%	 and	 5.8%	 in	 2021	 and	 2022,	 respectively.3 The lesser 
incidence of the pandemic, against the background of the progress in vaccination, 
and the implementation of the projects included under the European funds of the 
Next Generation EU (NGEU) programme will give rise, under this baseline scenario, 
to high growth in activity in the second half of this year. That will also exert a sizeably 
positive impact on the increase in GDP over the course of 2022. In 2023, the output 
3 These projections are part of the Eurosystem staff macroeconomic projections for the euro area. Box 1 in this 
Report describes in detail the projections by the Banco de España for Spain.
The reduction in the rate of infections and the headway in the vaccination campaign have allowed an easing of the containment measures. 
This has led to a rise in activity and in employment, particularly in the sectors most affected by the restrictions. Consumer price inflation has 
risen both in Spain and in the euro area as a whole, owing particularly to the impact on the rate of the energy component of the strong fall-off 
in oil prices a year back.
ECONOMIC ACTIVITY HAS RISEN IN 2021 Q2 (a)
Chart 2
SOURCES: Eurostat, INE and Banco de España.
a Quarter-on-quarter rates of change based on the seasonally adjusted series in the case of GDP, and year-on-year rates of change in the case of the 
consumer price indices.
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growth rate will be 1.8%. The pre-crisis level of GDP will be reached towards the end 
of next year.
As	has	been	the	case	since	the	start	of	 the	pandemic,	 the	high	uncertainty	
prevailing	has	prompted	alternative	scenarios	to	be	set	out. These scenarios 
differ from the baseline in the assumptions formulated about pandemic-related 
developments, the pace of the reduction in the saving rate and the scarring left by 
the pandemic on the economy’s productive system. Under the favourable and 
adverse scenarios, GDP is expected to grow by 6.8% and 4.6%, respectively, this 
year. 
The	 risks	 to	 economic	 activity	 are	 currently	 more	 balanced	 than	 in	 past	
projections	exercises.	Uncertainty remains high, however. First, epidemiologically 
ECONOMIC DYNAMICS IN RECENT MONTHS AND THE ATTENDANT OUTLOOK IN SPAIN AND GLOBALLY
Figure 1
SOURCE: Banco de España.
Optimism prevails on international 
financial markets, with stock market 
gains and declines in corporate credit 
spreads 
International trade flows remain 
buoyant, though bottlenecks in some 
products are occurring 
Commodities prices and overall inflation 
continue on a rising trend, although this is 
largely due to foreseeably transitory 
factors, with no significant upward 
pressures on core inflation discernible 
The growth outlook has been revised 
upwards globally, in the euro area and in 
Spain 
 Some sizeable risks persist:
− The recovery is still incomplete, very 
asymmetrical and fragile 
− Potential new strains of the virus 
continue to pose a global threat 
− Possible overheating of the US 
economy and abrupt tightening of 
global financing conditions 
− Possible persistent pandemic-related 
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speaking, there are still fears that the high circulation of the virus in extensive regions 
of the world may give rise to the emergence of new vaccine-resistant strains. And 
insofar as this were to entail continuing travel restrictions, it would adversely affect 
tourism flows. Second, the hypothetical rise in business insolvencies would lead to 
job losses and, possibly, to a deterioration in financial institutions’ capital, which 
might bear unfavourably on their capacity to lend. Conversely, the baseline scenario 
envisages a relatively slow reduction in the saving rate from the high levels seen 
during the crisis. But there is a possibility that this process may unfold more swiftly 
and sharply, and even that households may spend a substantial proportion of the 
income saved since the start of the lockdown. 
As	 in	 other	 geographies,	 Spain	 too	 has	 recently	 seen	 some	 increase	 in	
inflationary	pressures	in	the	early	price-formation	stages.	The rise in the inflation 
of commodities and non-energy industrial prices has not so far filtered through to 
the consumer prices of these goods. Indeed, the past evidence available suggests 
that this pass-through, which will in any event take around six months, will be only 
partial.
Under	 the	baseline	scenario,	 the	pace	of	 the	core	component	of	consumer	
prices	will	continue	to	be	modest.	The high degree of slack in the economy and 
moderate wage growth both point in this direction. In the medium term, the pick-up 
in activity will prompt something of a rise in core inflation (the HICP measure 
excluding energy and food), to 1.1% on average in 2023. In terms of overall inflation, 
this rate would be 1.2%. Apart from the risks arising from the potential materialisation 
of other forms of uncertainty affecting activity, this baseline scenario is subject to 
the risk of the inflationary pressures observed in the preliminary stages of the price-
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This box is part of the “Quarterly report on the Spanish economy” for 2021 Q2
Overview
After its Governing Council meeting on 10 June, the 
European Central Bank (ECB) released its latest 
projections for the euro area, covering the period 2021-
2023.1 This box describes the projections for the Spanish 
economy that constitute the Banco de España’s 
contribution to these aggregate euro area forecasts. The 
projections for Spain include the new information that has 
come to light in the period from the publication date of the 
previous projections (23 March, in Economic Bulletin 
1/20212) to 27 May. 
The recovery the Spanish economy embarked on in the 
second half of last year was interrupted in 2021 Q1, when 
GDP fell by -0.5%, according to INE’s preliminary 
estimates (a rate very close to the Banco de España figure 
of -0.4% in its March baseline scenario). This fall-off in 
output was in a setting in which the rise in the incidence 
of the pandemic around the turn of the year made a 
tightening of the measures applied to contain it necessary, 
and in which other temporary factors (including the 
snowstorm in early January and the blocking of the Suez 
Canal) also exerted something of an adverse impact on 
economic activity. In any event, the decline in the 
incidence of the pandemic as from early February allowed 
for a gradual easing in restrictions, which was conducive 
to a progressive improvement in activity over the course 
of the quarter.
On the latest information available, this rebound in activity 
has stepped up notably in Q2, in line with the more 
favourable course of the pandemic. Specifically, progress 
in the vaccination campaign has led to a reduction in 
infections which, since they are moreover concentrated in 
younger population groups, has given rise to a fall in the 
proportion of serious cases and, therefore, of deaths. That 
has provided for a gradual easing of the lockdown 
measures, marked most notably by the end of the state of 
alert on 9 May. 
The improved conjunctural data is particularly patent in 
firms’ response to the latest edition of the Banco de 
España Survey on Economic Activity (EBAE by its 
Spanish acronym),3 in effective Social Security 
registrations (i.e. discounting furloughed workers) and in 
the confidence indicators. In all instances, a common 
feature is that the recovery is sharper in services, in 
keeping with the partial lifting of the restrictions that 
weighed on those activities in which social interaction 
plays a key role. And that, in short, is – from the standpoint 
of the productive sectors – widening the base 
underpinning the recovery. By way of example, the PMI 
services index has stood since April, for the first time in 
almost a year, at levels consistent with the expansionary 
behaviour of the sector’s value added.
In light of this information, GDP is expected to rise 
significantly in quarter-on-quarter terms in Q2. However, 
the uncertainty over the scale of this rebound is high. 
First, estimates from the short-term models are beset by 
the logical constraints derived from the relative shortage 
of data for Q2. In particular, there is no quantitative 
information on developments in activity in June, and that 
for May is very limited. Further, interpreting the incoming 
data has become more complex as from this quarter 
because the year-to-year comparisons have lost much of 
their informativeness (since they are set against the 
months in 2020 subsequent to the outbreak of the 
pandemic).4 Given the caution these considerations 
demand, it is estimated that GDP growth in Q2 could rise 
to 2.2% quarter-on-quarter under the baseline scenario of 
these projections.
Despite the favourable recent developments, the 




1  See the Eurosystem staff macroeconomic projections for the euro area, June 2021.
2  Compared with the Macroeconomic projections in Spain (2021-2023), published as Box 1 of the “Quarterly report on the Spanish economy” in 
Economic Bulletin 1/2021, the current projections include the changes observed between 16 March and 18 May in the technical assumptions, in the 
budgetary assumptions and in the projected course of the external setting of the economy (except regarding the euro area, for which the data cut-off 
date is 26 May). Furthermore, the projections include the Quarterly National Accounts (QNA) preliminary estimates for 2021 Q1. 
3  M. Izquierdo (2021), Encuesta a las empresas españolas sobre la evolución de su actividad (EBAE): tercera edición, Notas Económicas, Economic 
Bulletin 2/2021, Banco de España.
4  Further, from a more technical perspective, the difficulties the models are experiencing in correctly interpreting the incoming data (given that these are 
more influenced by the ups and downs of the pandemic and the restrictions adopted to counter its effects than they are by the changes in economic 
dynamics) are being compounded in these months, because of the diminished capacity of the procedures to isolate the purely seasonal component 
of the series.
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influenced by the uncertainty as to the time horizon 
needed to fully overcome the health crisis. The current 
acceleration in the ongoing vaccination rollout is 
contributing, as indicated, to containing the rate at which 
the pandemic is spreading. And that provides a favourable 
setting for the Spanish economy to embark upon a 
sustained growth phase. Yet, on the other hand, the very 
lifting of the containment measures is checking the decline 
in the rate of reproduction of the virus, which prevents 
fully ruling out the possibility of a fresh outbreak of the 
pandemic, as shown by the experience of some 
economies which have moved forward more swiftly than 
Spain in the vaccination process. These difficulties in fully 
controlling the virus in the short term, which also – 
naturally – affect other economies in our orbit, are 
significant for Spain insofar as our productive structure 
rests to a greater extent than in other countries on tourism, 
a fact all the more important given the proximity of the 
summer high season. Specifically, drawing on the tourist 
sector’s latest forecasts, it is estimated under the baseline 
scenario of these projections that tourism exports will 
post, in Q3 this year, a level close to 50% of that recorded 
in the same period in 2019 (see Chart 2).
In line with the official forecasts, the projections consider 
that, by late August, 70% of the Spanish population will 
have been vaccinated. Thereafter, it would be possible to 
take further steps towards lifting and ultimately eliminating 
the containment measures by end-2021.5 Under this 
assumption, activity in Spain as from the second half of 
this year would cease to depend on epidemiological 
considerations. 
The projections envisage a continuation of the surge in 
activity until end-2021, in step with the pick-up in the 
productive sectors that have so far been most affected by 
the pandemic-related restrictions. The increase in output will 
be boosted, moreover, by a series of additional factors. First, 
the outlook for growth in Spain’s trading partners is gradually 
improving, assisted by the ongoing support of economic 
policies globally.6 The recovery in world markets is being led 
by the advanced economies, whose progress in terms of 
vaccination has been much greater than that of the emerging 
countries taken as a whole. The improvement in Spanish 
export markets has been particularly marked in the cases of 
the United States – where the economic outlook has been 
assisted by the recent fiscal policy announcements – and, to 
a lesser extent, the United Kingdom.
Moreover, the monetary policy measures adopted by the 
ECB to date and the fiscal policy measures in Spain will 
continue, over the projection horizon, to provide 
considerable support to aggregate demand and to private 
agents’ incomes. That will restrict, under this baseline 
scenario, the scarring the crisis may leave on the productive 
system and labour market (in terms of the destruction of 
firms and of increased structural unemployment). Also, 
that would limit the scale of the phenomena involving the 
financial amplification of the crisis, resulting from the 
“doom loop” of worsening solvency of households and 
firms on one hand, and of financial institutions on the 
other. Among the economic policy measures that will be 
conducive to increasing the pace of activity, it is specifically 
worth mentioning the Next Generation EU (NGEU) 
programme.
Compared with the March exercise, the overall impact of 
the changes in the current projection assumptions on 
economic growth is positive. Specifically, the favourable 
effects on activity of the more dynamic performance of 
external markets exceed the negative impact of certain 
other assumptions, including in particular higher crude 
prices and, to a lesser extent, the appreciation of the 
exchange rate.
In consequence, GDP growth is expected to reach 6.2% 
in 2021 overall (see Chart 3 and Table 1). The period of 
high output growth rates up to the end of 2021 will be 
followed by another period of more moderate growth up 
to the end of the projection horizon. However, the strong 
economic momentum during the rest of this year will 
give rise to a significant carry-over effect on the average 
rate of change of GDP in 2022, of 5.8%. In 2023, GDP 
growth will slow to 1.8%.7 GDP will not return to its pre-
5  The EU vaccination strategy calls on Member States  to accelerate vaccine rollout, so that “by summer 2021, Member States should have vaccinated 
a minimum of 70% of the adult population”.
6  The assumptions on export market developments, which are set out in greater detail in Annex 1, are drawn from the Eurosystem staff macroeconomic 
projections for the euro area, June 2021.
7  See J. González Mínguez and C. Martínez Carrascal (2019), “The relationship between average annual and quarter-on-quarter GDP growth rates: 
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pandemic level until the last part of 2022, and will be 
1.9% above that level at the end of the projection 
horizon. This suggests that the impact of the health 
crisis, albeit temporary, will be relatively persistent (see 
Chart 4). 
These projections, in comparison with those published in 
March, include an upward revision of GDP growth for 
2021 and 2022 (of 0.2 pp and 0.5 pp, respectively), which 
reflects the positive impact on activity of the change in the 
projection assumptions and the greater dynamism of GDP 
in the current quarter. This offsets the modest negative 
effects associated with the revision of the historical data.8
The uncertainties relating to the pandemic and its 
economic consequences
The level of uncertainty surrounding the course of the 
pandemic has decreased significantly since the last 
8  According to the INE flash estimate, the quarterly decline in GDP in Q1 was 0.1 pp more than that envisaged in March under the baseline scenario. 
The latest Quarterly National Accounts figures also entailed minor revisions to the growth rates of the previous two quarters. All this means that the 
starting point of the level of activity for these forecasts is somewhat less favourable, from the standpoint of the annual average growth rate in 2021, 
than was anticipated under the baseline scenario published in March.
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projection exercise. However, as described above, these 
uncertainties are still relatively high, especially in the very 
short term. In addition, even when the health crisis is over, 
the consequences of the pandemic will remain. These 
consequences may take very different forms, ranging 
from possible scarring in terms of destruction of the 
productive system and higher long-term unemployment, 
to changes in economic agents’ behaviour. In view of 
these sources of uncertainty, and as has been the case 
since the start of the pandemic, two alternative scenarios 
are formulated, the benign and the adverse scenario.
In the very short term, the differences between the two 
scenarios are warranted, as indicated above, by the scant 
volume of data available at the current juncture on 
2021 Q2 and by their hard-to-calibrate relationship with 
economic activity, in a setting in which the relationship 
between this variable and the mobility indicators has 
recently tended to become less stable. 
In the second half of 2021, one of the aspects that 
changes in the different scenarios is the course of the 
pandemic. The alternative scenarios include the same 
vaccination timeline as the baseline scenario, since 
considerably fewer uncertainties are now envisaged in 
this respect. Under the benign scenario the decline in the 
incidence of the pandemic observed in recent weeks 
continues, enabling the easing of the remaining restrictions 
on economic activity to be brought forward. By contrast, 
the adverse scenario envisages the possibility of fresh 
infections, possibly linked to the appearance of variants 
of the virus that are more infectious and may be resistant 
to vaccines, requiring the re-establishment of restrictions 
on movement and on some economic activities that entail 
high levels of personal contact. These alternative 
assumptions are critical to determine the rate of recovery 
of tourism in the summer months.
In 2022 and 2023 the differences between the various 
scenarios are not related to the course of the pandemic, 
but they do have as a common denominator the 
uncertainty surrounding the economic consequences of 
the pandemic in the medium term, insofar as possible 
changes in economic agents’ behaviour are concerned, 
and also the possible scarring of the Spanish productive 
system as a result of the crisis.
Possible changes in households’ behaviour have direct 
implications for two components of aggregate demand: 
private consumption and tourism flows. In the case of 
private consumption, the pandemic has triggered a huge 
surge in the household saving rate, given that households 
have substantially reduced their current expenditure in a 
setting in which their income has scarcely been affected 
thanks to the economic policy measures adopted.9 This 
increase in the saving rate has been partly forced by the 
9  See “Household saving during the pandemic and its possible effects on the future recovery in consumption”, Box 4, “Quarterly report on the Spanish 
economy”, Economic Bulletin 1/2021, Banco de España.
SOURCES: Banco de España and INE.
NOTE: Latest QNA figure published: 2021 Q1.
a Projections cut-off date: 27 May 2021.
b Annual average.
2020 2021 2022 2023 2020 2021 2022 2023 2020 2021 2022 2023 2020 2021 2022 2023
June 2021 (baseline scenario) -10.8 6.2 5.8 1.8 -0.3 1.9 1.2 1.2 0.5 0.3 1.0 1.1 15.5 15.6 14.7 13.7
March 2021 (baseline scenario) -11.0 6.0 5.3 1.7 -0.3 1.4 0.8 1.2 0.5 0.5 1.0 1.1 15.5 17.0 15.1 14.1
GDP
Harmonised index of 
consumer prices (HICP)
Unemployment rate
(% of labour force) (b)
HICP excluding energy 
and food
Table 1
MACROECONOMIC PROJECTIONS FOR THE SPANISH ECONOMY (a)
Annual rate of change
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pandemic containment measures which made it 
impossible to consume certain goods and services. And it 
is partly attributable to more precautionary saving by 
households against the backdrop of uncertainty.
Over the projection horizon, the lifting of the measures 
imposed thus far to contain the virus will see the forced 
saving component disappear completely, while the lower 
uncertainty should lead the voluntary saving component 
to shrink. Under the baseline scenario, it is assumed that 
the saving rate steadily declines over the coming years, 
although the average for 2023 would remain somewhat 
above its pre-crisis level (see Chart 1). This implies that 
the high volume of savings built up since the onset of the 
pandemic would not be reduced. Several factors support 
this assumption. First, it is chiefly higher-income 
households that have saved and they have a lower 
propensity to consume. Second, the suppressed spending 
may not be easily recovered, since most would have been 
spending on services (such as hotels and restaurants, for 
example) that cannot be easily deferred (unlike spending 
on durable goods). Lastly, households may decide to 
voluntarily restrict their spending levels in anticipation of 
higher taxes in the future on account of the high volume of 
government debt built up during the crisis.
Under the benign scenario, it is assumed that households 
will use a portion of the savings built up in the form of 
liquid assets during the crisis to increase their 
consumption. The corollary to this would be a more 
pronounced reduction in the household saving rate 
compared with the baseline scenario, to stand below pre-
crisis levels from 2022. By contrast, under the adverse 
scenario, more cautious behaviour by households will 
lead to a somewhat slower recovery in consumption, such 
that the saving rate will hold above pre-crisis levels 
throughout the projection horizon.
The pace of recovery in tourism exports also varies 
between the scenarios. This owes, in the near term, to 
the differing assumptions regarding the course of the 
pandemic and, from 2022, agents’ attitudes towards 
spending, including the levels of precautionary saving 
they wish to maintain, how far the preference – seemingly 
observed since the onset of the pandemic – for domestic 
tourism is reversed and, in the case of firms, the 
resumption of business travel. At the end of the projection 
horizon, inbound tourism flows will stand close to pre-
crisis levels under the baseline scenario and above pre-
crisis levels under the benign scenario. They will remain 
around 10% below pre-crisis levels under the adverse 
scenario.
As regards the fallout of the crisis on the productive 
system, as has been noted, the baseline scenario 
envisages moderate scarring at the aggregate level. As an 
example, in the labour market, the average expected 
unemployment rate in 2023 (13.7%) is 0.4 pp below that 
observed in 2019, the last year prior to the onset of the 
pandemic, yet this does not reflect a decline in the labour 
force, which on the contrary is expected to grow by 0.4% 
between 2019 and 2023 in average annual terms. Similarly, 
given the projected trajectory for non-financial 
corporations’ gross investment and the pace of 
consumption of fixed capital, the corporate capital stock 
would be higher in 2023 than prior to the pandemic. These 
favourable developments partially reflect the effectiveness 
of the policies deployed to address the crisis, one of 
whose central aims was precisely to stave off any lasting 
damage to the economy’s productive capacity. They also, 
in part, owe to the fact that, although the crisis has had a 
very severe impact on some sectors (such as hospitality), 
the bulk of the effects are likely to be temporary, since a 
priori these sectors were not oversized; this stands in 
contrast to the global financial crisis, when there was an 
evident need to reduce capacity in the construction 
sector. 
However, despite these positive aspects, it cannot be 
ignored that the crisis may bring about far-reaching 
structural changes in the economy’s productive system, 
requiring the reallocation of factors of production between 
different sectors and firms. Unlike the baseline scenario, 
the more benign scenario assumes that this reallocation 
of resources will be frictionless. By contrast, under the 
adverse scenario, the overindebtedness of some 
segments of the corporate sector, on account of the 
lengthy period of severely reduced revenue during the 
pandemic, will lead to a higher volume of business failures. 
The subsequent adverse impact on banks’ capital ratios 
would drive up the cost of finance for households and 
firms, while also reducing its availability, with the ensuing 
adverse repercussions for economic activity.
Under the benign scenario, GDP growth in 2021 would be 
somewhat higher than under the baseline scenario 
throughout the projection horizon, which would allow GDP 












Chart  4). By contrast, the more moderate pace of GDP 
recovery under the adverse scenario would see GDP remain 
slightly short of its pre-crisis level at end-2023.
Developments	in	the	main	macroeconomic	
aggregates	in	the	baseline	scenario
From the standpoint of the composition of aggregate 
demand, the projected recovery will rely mainly on the 
domestic component. However, the contribution of the 
external sector to GDP growth will also be positive over 
the three-year projection horizon. 
All components of private domestic demand will rebound 
strongly this year after declining sharply in 2020 (see Table 
2). Private consumption declined in 2021 Q1, affected by 
the tightening of the pandemic-containment measures at 
the start of the year. However, according to the indicators 
available, this aggregate has strengthened in the current 
quarter. This greater dynamism seems to be borne out by 
the lower accumulation of household bank deposits and 
the slight increase in consumer lending. As vaccines are 
rolled out, a loosening of the restrictions that, despite the 
easing in Q2, still constrain some activities is to be 
expected. This will allow the expansionary behaviour of 
this aggregate to continue.
Consumption will also benefit from the gradual recovery in 
the labour market and, as a result, in household income, 
where the weight of labour income will increase at the 
expense of public transfers. In addition, the gradual 
decline in uncertainty over the health and economic 
developments will likely favour a reduction in the 
precautionary component of saving and further boost 
household spending. As a result, consumption would rise 
by 7.1% in 2021 under the baseline scenario. In 2022, on 
average, the rate would still be high (5.7%) owing to the 
positive carry-over effect stemming from the strong 
growth expected between Q2 and Q4 this year. 
Consumption would reach its pre-pandemic level in early 
2023. 
Among the components of gross capital formation, 
residential investment is similarly expected to regain 
upward momentum as uncertainty is dispelled and future 
household income expectations, which have been 
adversely affected by the deterioration in the labour 
market since the outbreak of the pandemic, improve. An 
additional factor that will boost growth in this aggregate is 
the implementation of the NGEU. In this regard, in the 
detailed description of how Spain would use the transfers 
it receives from the European Recovery and Resilience 
Facility, a large amount is allocated to housing 
rehabilitation, according to the Recovery, Transformation 
and Resilience Plan (RTRP).
In line with its expected recovery profile over the projection 
horizon, investment by non-financial corporations will be 
particularly buoyant in 2021 H2, spurred by the 
implementation of the NGEU, the recovery in final demand 
(which will increase capacity utilisation) and the gradual 
decline in uncertainty. The different productive sectors’ 
digitalisation needs, which have increased after the 
pandemic, would also contribute to a rise in this aggregate, 
in a setting of low financing costs, although these are 
expected to increase somewhat.
In any event, productive investment will foreseeably 
behave unevenly across sectors. In particular, in those 
industries whose revenues have dwindled significantly as 
a result of the measures applied to contain the pandemic, 
there will be firms emerging from the health crisis with a 
weakened financial position. They are therefore more 
likely to face a shortage of funds with which to undertake 
new investments.10 In this respect, it should be noted, 
first, that this financial distress should be alleviated by the 
measures put in place to support viable firms in a 
vulnerable situation and, second, that the investment 
needs of these firms are unlikely to be high, at least in the 
short term, given their current low level of capacity 
utilisation. 
The pandemic has had a significant impact on trade with 
the rest of the world. Its effect has proved much more 
short-lived in the case of goods flows, which have now 
returned to pre-crisis levels, than in tourism, as the 
restrictions still in place impinge much more strongly on 
the movement of people between different countries. 
However, a number of factors simultaneously at play at 
the beginning of the year dampened the vigour of goods 
exports. These include the shortage of electronic 
10  See Chapter 3 “The effects of the COVID-19 crisis on the productive sectors in Spain: economic and financial implications”, Annual Report 2020, 
Banco de España. 








components – which especially affected the car industry, 
whose share of Spanish goods exports is particularly high 
(11%) – and certain logistical difficulties associated with 
the implementation of Brexit or the Suez Canal obstruction. 
The first of these factors is relevant, insofar as there is a 
risk that it could persist to some extent throughout 2021. 
By contrast, the different stimulus packages announced 
in the United States (the destination of 5% of Spain’s 
goods exports), which are included in the external 
assumptions of this projections exercise, will contribute 
positively to the buoyancy of goods exports.
In the case of tourism exports, the fresh wave of the 
pandemic in Spain between end-2020 and early 2021 and 
the consequent restrictions on movement and activity 
meant that flows of tourists remained at very low levels in 
Q1. Looking ahead to the summer, the strides made with 
the vaccination campaigns in Spain and in the main 
tourism generating markets will only lead to a slight and 
partial recovery, insofar as sufficiently high levels of 
population immunity are yet to be achieved. In the 
projections, inbound tourism flows will not return to pre-
health crisis levels until end-2023.
Imports will also recover gradually over the projection 
horizon, in tandem with the trajectory of final demand. 
Further, growth in imports will be underpinned by the high 
momentum of components with a larger import content, 
such as investment in capital goods and exports. Similarly 
to exports, tourism by Spanish residents in the rest of the 
SOURCES: Banco de España and INE.
NOTE: Latest QNA figure published: 2021 Q1.
a Projections cut-off date: 27 May 2021.
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Unemployment rate (% of labour force).
Annual average 15.5 15.2 13.7 12.8 15.6 14.7 13.7 16.2 15.7 14.6
Net lending (+)/net borrowing (-) of the nation 
(% of GDP) 1.1 1.9 3.7 3.7 1.5 3.1 3.1 0.8 2.1 2.3
General government net lending (+)/net borrowing (-) (% 
of GDP) -11.0 -7.8 -4.1 -3.3 -8.2 -4.9 -4.3 -8.9 -5.9 -5.4
General government debt (% of GDP) 120.0 119.0 114.7 113.3 120.1 117.9 118.0 122.6 122.1 123.4
Benign scenario Baseline scenario Adverse scenario
June 2021 projections
Table 2
PROJECTIONS FOR THE MAIN MACROECONOMIC AGGREGATES OF THE SPANISH ECONOMY (a)
Annual rate of change in volume terms and % of GDP








world will remain very weak for a relatively extended 
period of time.
In the labour market, hours worked will return to an 
upward path as of Q2, in line with the recovery in output. 
Hours worked are projected to grow by 6.7% in 2021, 
subsequently moderating to 5.4% and 1.8% in 2022 and 
2023, respectively. This recovery in employment would 
lower unemployment, which would fall below its pre-
pandemic level as of end-2022.
The general government balance is expected to improve 
significantly over the projection horizon, after the acute 
deterioration in 2020. The decrease in the budget deficit 
will be due to the temporary nature of some of the 
discretionary measures adopted to contend with the 
fallout from the pandemic and to the cyclical improvement. 
Nevertheless, the general government deficit will still be 
very high in 2023 (4.3% of GDP). As a result of these 
budget balance developments and the projected path for 
nominal GDP, the government debt-to-GDP ratio, which in 
2020 surged to 120%, would barely decline by 2 pp over 
the projection horizon.
Prices	and	costs
Since the early summer of 2020, core inflation has 
recorded rates of change of approximately zero. Such low 
growth rates are largely associated with the negative base 
effects stemming from the decline in the prices of the 
services hardest hit by the pandemic. The disappearance 
of these base effects as of summer 2021, together with 
the gradual recovery in demand for consumer goods and 
services, above all precisely in those sectors most 
adversely affected by the containment measures, appears 
to lead to gradual increases in the core inflation rate from 
mid-2021. Despite this upward pattern, core inflation will 
remain at moderate levels over the projection horizon to 
stand at 1.1% on average in 2023.
Headline HICP has increased considerably in 2021 to 
date. This is above all the result of the energy component, 
which is being highly influenced by the base effects 
stemming from the sharp drop in oil prices during the 
initial stages of the pandemic. In 2022, the marked 
deceleration in energy prices would comfortably offset the 
increase in the prices of services and, to a lesser degree, 
of non-energy industrial goods, such that the change in 
headline HICP would moderate to 1.2%, the level at which 
it would remain in 2023. 
Risks
The macroeconomic outlook remains highly uncertain. 
Among these uncertainties, the share of purely 
epidemiological aspects has fallen, against a background 
in which the vaccines have proven highly effective against 
the virus and the immunisation of the population has 
accelerated. However, epidemiological developments will 
continue to have a bearing on activity in the coming 
quarters, given the possibility of fresh bouts of infections, 
linked to a potential spread of variants of the virus that are 
more infectious and, in the worst-case scenario, resistant 
to vaccines. The likelihood of a variant with such 
characteristics emerging in Spain is low, given the 
headway made with the vaccination campaign, which has 
significantly reduced the spread of the virus. However, the 
probability of episodes of this kind arising from cases 
imported from abroad is somewhat higher. Nevertheless, 
in terms of the pandemic, the greatest risk to economic 
activity is the possible emergence of more contagious 
strains in emerging economies where the virus is more 
widely spread and fewer strides have been made with 
vaccination.
Furthermore, as described above, economic risks exist 
that, while linked to the pandemic, are essentially 
associated with how consumers might use the savings 
reservoir they have built up since the onset of the crisis, 
the pace of the recovery in tourism exports and the 
persistence of the effects of the crisis on potential growth 
(via the possible impact on long-term unemployment and 
business deaths). How all these risks might materialise 
has been captured by constructing alternative scenarios.
Lastly, these scenarios have not factored in other sources 
of uncertainty, such as how quickly the projects under the 
NGEU programme will be implemented and the difficulties 
of measuring their multiplier effect on activity, and the 
scope of the public policies to ward off fall-out effects 
from the crisis, help reallocate resources and drive the 
economy’s structural transformation. 
All these factors that may result in activity drifting from the 
pattern considered under the baseline scenario are also 
sources of uncertainty regarding the path of inflation. 
Further, under the baseline scenario it is assumed that 
there will be limited pass-through to final prices and 
wages of the higher input costs for firms. Otherwise, this 
would result in greater inflationary pressure. In the 








opposite direction, the response of consumer prices to 
the recovery in demand could be weaker than that 
included in the baseline scenario, in light of the low 
sensitivity of the former of these variables to the latter in 
recent years.
Considered overall, all these elements result in a risk 
profile that is balanced in relation to the projections’ 
baseline scenario in terms of both activity and prices.
ANNEX 1 
Projection assumptions
The assumptions are taken from the “June 2021 
Eurosystem staff macroeconomic projections for the euro 
area”. The cut-off date for the data included in the 
projections is 18 May in all cases, except for Spain’s euro 
area export markets, for which it is 26 May. The 
assumptions regarding the paths of interest rates, 
exchange rates, and oil and other commodity prices are 
based on the prices observed in the respective markets 
in the 10 working days prior to that date. The paths for 
export markets and the prices of competitors in their 
domestic currency have been prepared by Eurosystem 
staff.
In comparison with the March scenarios, some notable 
changes to the assumptions used for the baseline 
scenario have been made. First, export market 
developments are now expected to be more favourable 
than was anticipated three months ago, especially in 2021 
and 2022, with upward revisions to growth rates of around 
1pp in 2021 and 2022 and 0.3 pp in 2023 with respect to 
the March projections. Second, oil prices are now 
somewhat higher than anticipated in March, especially in 
2022-2023. Following their sharp fall in 2020, oil prices 
increased notably in 2021, in line with the recovery in 
world demand. They are expected to stand on average 
this year at $65.8 per barrel, an upward revision to the 
March assumption of 1.4%. Subsequently, they are 
expected to trend downwards, reaching $61.9 in 2023 
(5.2% higher than in the March projections exercise). 
Third, non-energy commodity prices in 2021 have also 
been revised upwards significantly, with respect to March, 
but their subsequent downward trend is also more 
marked, so that in 2023 they will be somewhat lower than 
was anticipated three months ago. 
The other changes to the external assumptions used in 
March are more modest and, consequently, have a 
smaller impact on the projections. The euro exchange 
rate (assumed in the projection horizon using its spot 
market rate) has appreciated slightly compared with 
three months ago. The appreciation with respect to 
March is somewhat greater against the dollar than in 
nominal effective terms, but is no more than 2% in either 
case.
Lastly, the yields on securities traded on 10-year 
sovereign bond markets have followed a slightly upward 
trend in recent months, and, as a result, are somewhat 
higher over the projection horizon than in the March 
projections exercise. As for market expectations of short-
term interest rates, 3-month EURIBOR is assumed to rise 
slightly, from -0.5% in 2021 to -0.3% in 2023.
With regard to fiscal policy, the projections are based on 
the budgets for 2021 approved by the various tiers of 
government, as well as Spain’s Stability Programme 
Update for 2021-2024 (SPU 2021) and the RTRP recently 
sent to Brussels. The latest available budget outturn 
data, based on National Accounts criteria and published 
by the National Audit Office (IGAE), are taken into 
account.
With respect to the previous quarter, the new extension, 
to September this year, of the special benefits for self-
employed and furloughed workers approved on 27 May 11 
is incorporated, as are subsidies to businesses with 
viability problems as a result of the pandemic, which were 
approved in March.12 Also, the estimate of the revenue 
from the new taxes introduced at the beginning of this 
year or currently pending approval is revised slightly 
11  The conditions applicable to the self-employed and employees whose activity is suspended due to COVID-19 are slightly revised for this extension. 
Most notably, however, new exemptions from social contributions are introduced for workers returning to their jobs and for the self-employed who 
were receiving benefits on 31 May (see Royal Decree-Law 11/2011).
12  These measures include: €7 billion in the form of direct subsidies to businesses, €3 billion for debt restructuring and €1 billion for capital injections 
(see Royal Decree-Law 5/2021). The negative impact on the general government balance is €10 billion, since the capital injections raise general 
government financial assets and debt, but do not affect the budget balance. The projections assume that the bulk of this impact will take place in 
2021 (€8.5 billion).








downwards.13 14 All in all, the net overall impact on the 
general government deficit of the measures approved for 
this year amounts to 2.1% of GDP (2 pp less than in 2020).
Also, the assumptions on absorption by Spanish general 
government of the NGEU funds have been revised in the 
light of the new information contained in the RTRP (which, 
following its presentation on 30 April, must be approved 
shortly by the European authorities) and the SPU 2021. 
The degree of detail on the projects to be undertaken 
using NGEU funds is now greater. However, a considerable 
degree of uncertainty still remains regarding the rate at 
which these funds can be absorbed by Spanish general 
government and, consequently, regarding the timing of 
their use. The new projections for 2021 incorporate 
around 50% of the amount announced by the Government 
SOURCES: Banco de España and ECB.
a Cut-off date for assumptions: 18 May 2021. Figures expressed as levels are annual averages; the figures expressed as rates are calculated on the 
basis of the related annual averages.
b The differences are in rates for export markets, in levels for oil prices and the dollar/euro exchange rate, in percentages for the nominal effective 
exchange rate and in percentage points for interest rates.
c The assumptions regarding the behaviour of Spain's export markets presented in the table are obtained from the June 2021 ECB staff 
macroeconomic projections for the euro area.
d A positive percentage change in the nominal effective exchange rate denotes an appreciation of the euro.
e For the projection period, the figures in the table are technical assumptions, prepared following the Eurosystem’s methodology. These assumptions 
are based on futures market prices or on proxies thereof and should not be interpreted as a Eurosystem prediction as to the course of these 
variables.
2020 2021 2022 2023 2021 2022 2023
International environment
    Spain's exports markets (c) Benign scenario 10.0 7.7 3.5 -0.1 1.9 0.3
Baseline scenario -10.9 8.6 6.4 3.5 0.9 1.0 0.3
Adverse scenario 5.1 3.3 3.3 1.6 0.3 -0.4
0.33.39.09.166.468.563.24)level( lerrab/srallod ni ecirp liO    
Monetary and financial conditions
20.020.010.012.112.112.141.1)level( etar egnahcxe orue/ralloD    
117.8 122.7 123.0 123.0 0.9 1.4 1.4
    Short-term interest rates
    (3-month Euribor) (e) -0.4 -0.5 -0.5 -0.3 0.0 0.0 0.1
0.4 0.5 0.9 1.1 0.2 0.3 0.3
    Long-term interest rates
    (10-year Spanish government bond yield) (e)
Difference between the current 
projections and those of the 
corresponding scenario of 
March 2021 (b)
    Nominal effective exchange rate against the non-euro area (d)
    (2000=100)
June 2021 projections
Table 3
INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENT AND MONETARY AND FINANCIAL CONDITIONS (a)
Annual rate of change, unless otherwise indicated 
13  This includes the new taxes on certain digital services and financial transactions and the tax increases included in the State Budget for 2021, as well 
as the new taxes on non-reusable plastics and waste, currently before Parliament. The estimated overall impact is revised slightly downwards on the 
basis of the latest information available and the latest government estimates included in the SPU 2021.
14  The impact on the 2021 public finances of the reversion to the State of various motorway sections owned by ACESA is also taken into account, as 
is the compensation of that company for construction work carried out (see SPU 2021).








for this year, considering both funds from the RRM and 
from REACT-EU. For the projection horizon as a whole, 
absorption is expected to be slightly above 80% of the 
total funds available in the form of grants, the largest 
stimulus being concentrated in 2022.
Beyond 2021, and excluding the impact of the European 
funds, the forecasts are based on the usual technical 
assumptions. In particular, those items subject to greater 
discretionality -such as public investment and 
procurement, in particular, given their volume- are 
expected to grow in line with the growth potential of the 
Spanish economy. Also, in the absence of specific 
measures, the trajectory of the remaining items of the 
general government accounts is assumed to be governed 
by their usual determinants.15
With these assumptions and forecasts for the fiscal 
policy variables, and given the output gap estimated in a 
manner consistent with the other macroeconomic 
projections, the fiscal policy stance, measured as the 
change in the primary structural balance, net of European 
funds,16 is expected to be clearly expansionary again in 
2021 (1.8 pp of GDP) and slightly expansionary in 2022 
(0.4 pp), becoming contractionary in 2023 (-1.0 pp). 
These changes reflect the fact that the largest annual 
stimulus from the European funds is estimated to occur 
in 2021.
15  The European NGEU funds to be received entail a smaller structural deficit, but not a more contractionary fiscal policy stance, as they do not result 
from taxes collected from resident agents. Consequently, to correctly measure the fiscal policy stance, the change in the primary structural balance 
must be adjusted for this effect by subtracting the change in the net balance of funds from the European Union.
16  The European NGEU funds to be received entail a smaller structural deficit, but not a more contractionary fiscal policy stance, as they do not result 
from taxes collected from resident agents. Consequently, to correctly measure the fiscal policy stance, the change in the primary structural balance 
must be adjusted for this effect by subtracting the change in the net balance of funds from the European Union.
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In 2020, euro area GDP shrank by 6.7%, almost double the 
decline observed in the United States (3.5%). This relatively 
poorer behaviour of economic activity in the euro area 
reflected not only the deeper economic impact of the first 
wave of the COVID-19 pandemic, but also the fall-off in 
activity in the euro area in the final stretch of last year (and in 
early 2021) with the successive waves of the virus. This 
downturn was not observed in the United States (see Chart 1). 
Moreover, most analysts’ forecasts also predict a swifter 
exit from the crisis in the United States than in the euro 
area, a typical feature of the recoveries from previous 
recessionary episodes (see Chart 2). Thus, according to 
the European Commission’s spring forecasts,1 while the 
United States would exceed its pre-crisis GDP level by 
mid-2021, this would not occur in the euro area until early 
2022. 
This early-release box was published on 1 June
Box 2
SOME DETERMINANTS OF THE GROWTH DIFFERENTIAL BETWEEN THE EURO AREA AND THE UNITED STATES SINCE 
THE ONSET OF THE PANDEMIC
Marina Diakonova and Ana del Río
1  See European Commission (2021), Spring 2021 Economic Forecast: Rolling up sleeves.
SOURCES: European Commission, Fred, Google Mobility Report, John Hopkins University and Banco de España.
a Includes four recessions: 1975 Q1, 1980 Q3, 1993 Q1 (1991 Q1 for the United States) and 2009 Q2.
b Quarterly average of daily data on an average index of mobility at grocery and pharmacy stores, retail and recreation centres, workplaces and transit 
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Box 2
SOME DETERMINANTS OF THE GROWTH DIFFERENTIAL BETWEEN THE EURO AREA AND THE UNITED STATES SINCE 
THE ONSET OF THE PANDEMIC (cont’d)
This box sets out some of the factors that might account 
for this economic disparity since the onset of the 
pandemic, paying particular attention to specific aspects 
of the health crisis.
Firstly, it is worth stressing that, since the start of the 
pandemic, the restrictions applied to contain the 
expansion of the virus have been less stringent in the 
United States than in the euro area. Although this has 
prompted more unfavourable epidemiological developments 
in the US economy (see Chart 3),2 one consequence has 
been a lesser reduction in mobility in the United States. 
Thus, for instance, in 2020 as a whole, the decline in 
mobility in the United States was 16%, compared with 
20% in the euro area (see Chart 4).3 As Chart 5 shows, 
these differences in the behaviour of mobility – essentially 
associated with the differing severity of the lockdown 
measures in each region – help account for around 1 pp of 
the greater economic impact of the health crisis in the 
euro area.4 Mobility, therefore, is a significant but 
insufficient factor to fully explain the differential economic 
impact of the crisis in 2020 in both regions. Moreover, the 
different share in each region of the services sectors most 
affected in this crisis does not appear to be a key factor 
for explaining these differences. This is because these 
services generally display a relatively similar weight in 
these economies.5 Consequently, the conceptual 
framework used in this analysis would suggest the 
presence of other differential factors between the United 
States and the euro area that are not reflected in the 
variables considered. 
In this respect, one factor not included in the 
aforementioned analysis and which might, at least partly, 
account for the bigger average decline in GDP in 2020 in 
the euro area, is this region’s greater trade openness and, 
in conjunction, the bigger relative share in its productive 
structure of manufacturing (16% of GVA compared with 
11% in the United States). In 2020 H1, the decline in 
manufacturing activity totalled 20% in the euro area, set 
against 13% in the United States (see Chart 6). Such 
activity was affected not only by the stricter lockdowns 
across Europe, but also by the severely distorted 
international trade flows during the first stage of the 
pandemic.6 However, while the subsequent pick-up in 
manufacturing has been significant, its sharp initial 
contraction is estimated to have contributed notably to 
explaining the decline in activity in 2020 as a whole. 
In addition, some of the more favourable economic 
developments in the US may be the result of the impetus 
from economic policies. For instance, while the central 
banks’ monetary policy response in the euro area and in 
the United States was admittedly swift and forceful 
(ensuring favourable financing conditions and, in the case 
of the euro area, preventing financial fragmentation), in 
the United States the lowering of the policy interest rates 
from 1.50-1.75% at the onset of the health crisis to 
0-0.25% seems to have provided a further stimulus. 
Comparing the fiscal policy response is a complex task7 
because of, among other reasons, the particular features 
of the measures approved, the distinct role of the 
automatic stabilisers in each region and the fact that a 
significant portion of the euro area’s support has been 
channelled through public guarantees, which do not have 
an immediate direct impact on the budget deficit. In any 
event, the usual measurements for quantifying fiscal 
impulse − depicted in Chart 7, drawing on data from the 
IMF’s April 2021 Fiscal Monitor − indicate that to date it 
2  See Box 1.1, “Global epidemiological developments”, Chapter 1, Annual Report 2020, Banco de España.
3  To date in 2021, the fact that the US vaccination campaign has moved ahead appreciably more rapidly than in the euro area has prompted these 
differences to widen even further.
4  Regression for 27 EU countries and the United Kingdom. The impact of the crisis on 2020 GDP is accounted for by mobility variables, the share of the 
sectors most affected by the crisis and working from home (specifically, the number of employees who began to work from home as a consequence 
of the pandemic, according to the Eurofound Survey (2020), Living, working and COVID-19 dataset, Dublin). All variables expressed in differences with 
respect to the United States. The approach by A. L. Gómez and A. del Río (2021) in “La crisis sanitaria y el impacto inicial desigual sobre las economías 
del área del euro”, Documento Ocasional, Banco de España, forthcoming, is followed. For similar evidence, see IMF (2021), Differences in Output 
Performance between Europe and the United States during COVID-19, Online Annex, Regional Economic Outlook Update Europe.
5  The services sectors comprising accommodation services and restaurants, artistic and recreational activities, and other services account for around 
6% of GVA in the United States and the euro area. At a greater level of aggregation, retail, transport and hospitality, and artistic, recreational and other 
services have a share of 22% of GVA in the euro area, only marginally higher than the figure for the United States (21%).
6  See Box 2.2, “Global trade flows against the background of the pandemic”, Chapter 2, Annual Report 2020, Banco de España.
7  See Box 2, “Fiscal policy response to the crisis in the euro area and the United States”, “Quarterly report on the Spanish economy”, Economic Bulletin, 
4/2020, Banco de España.
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Box 2
SOME DETERMINANTS OF THE GROWTH DIFFERENTIAL BETWEEN THE EURO AREA AND THE UNITED STATES SINCE 
THE ONSET OF THE PANDEMIC (cont’d)
appears to have been somewhat larger in the United 
States. Looking ahead, both areas are considering a 
further significant fiscal impulse,8 with investment, 
particularly that related to combating climate change, 
SOURCES: Bureau of Economic Analysis, Eurostat, IMF and Banco de España.
a Cross-sectional regression weighted by the size of GDP for the 27 European Union Member States and the United Kingdom. The economic impact 
is measured as the difference between the change in GDP observed in 2020 and the change forecast before the health crisis, taking into account the 
European Commission’s January 2020 forecasts for all the countries except for the United States, which are drawn from the IMF’s January forecasts. 
All the variables are expressed as differences vis-à-vis the United States.
b “Euro area” includes the NGEU programme and “United States” includes the plans approved in December 2020 (Consolidated Appropriations Act, 
2021) and March 2021 (American Rescue Plan).
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8  See Box 3, “Analysis of US fiscal policy plans”, “Quarterly report on the Spanish economy”, Economic Bulletin, 1/2021, Banco de España.
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Box 2
SOME DETERMINANTS OF THE GROWTH DIFFERENTIAL BETWEEN THE EURO AREA AND THE UNITED STATES SINCE 
THE ONSET OF THE PANDEMIC (cont’d)
taking centre stage. In the United States these measures 
will materialise in the as yet unapproved American Jobs 
Plan and American Family Plan, the latter more focused 
on transfers to households, whereas in the euro area the 
stimulus will take the form of the Next Generation 
EU (NGEU) programme. The NGEU funds will complement 
those deployed in the Member States’ national plans.9 
Lastly, the fact that, in recent months, vaccination of the 
population has progressed more swiftly in the United 
States than in the euro area would also help explain why 
the US economy has been performing better. In this 
regard, by using the quantitative framework for analysing 
interactions between epidemiological developments, 
mobility restrictions and economic performance proposed 
by Rungcharoenkitkul (2021),10 it is possible to assess the 
impact that a vaccination strategy similar to that of the 
United States would have had on GDP in the euro 
area.  Specifically, Chart 8 considers a counterfactual 
(hypothetical) scenario in which the vaccinated population 
in the euro area would have reached 29% of the total 
population at the end of Q1 − rather than the 12% 
observed − and in which the EU target of vaccinating 70% 
of the adult population would be achieved at the beginning 
of July (instead of before the end of the summer, as 
envisaged in the EU’s current strategy).11 The economic 
effects of this alternative vaccination scenario would 
mostly arise in 2021 Q1 and the beginning of Q2, when 
the drop in mortality stemming from a faster vaccination 
strategy would have enabled the lockdown measures to 
have been eased earlier. Indeed, these more favourable 
epidemiological developments would have prevented the 
slowdown in economic activity observed in the euro area 
in 2021 Q1 and enabled somewhat greater growth in Q2. 
In terms of the year as a whole, this would result in euro 
area GDP in 2021 being on average 0.7 pp higher.
In short, the economic crisis induced by the COVID-19 
pandemic has been less acute in the United States than in 
the euro area, and the US economy is also expected to 
recover more quickly. The evidence presented in this box 
suggests that these differences may be partly explained 
by the role of public policies, in terms of containing the 
pandemic and at the economic level, and by other 
structural factors related to the euro area’s greater 
sensitivity to developments in world trade (which was hit 
hard in 2020 H1) and to the greater flexibility that the US 
economy has historically shown.
 9  See Box 2.3, “NGEU: an initiative bolstering the EU project”, Chapter 2, Annual Report 2020, Banco de España.
10  See P. Rungcharoenkitkul (2021), “Macroeconomic consequences of pandexit”, Working Papers, No 932, Bank for International Settlements.
11  See Communication from the Commission of 19 January 2021, “A united front to beat COVID-19”.
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One particular feature of the health crisis prompted by 
COVID-19 has been the unprecedented increase in the 
household saving rate globally. In the euro area and the 
United States, saving climbed from 13% and 7.5% of 
household gross disposable income at end-2019, 
respectively, to 20% and 16% at end-2020 (see Chart 1). 
This increase cannot be explained solely by developments 
in the usual determinants of consumption, which include 
income, wealth, interest rates and the level of uncertainty. 
On this occasion, a significant share of the increase in 
saving appears to have been “forced”, i.e. driven by 
households being unable to materialise a portion of their 
usual spending on certain goods and services owing to 
the pandemic lockdown measures. 
Indeed, according to an econometric model proxying 
household consumption,1 forced saving in the euro area in 
2020 amounted to an estimated 4.4 percentage points 
(pp) of GDP (accounting for virtually all of the increase in 
saving that year), while in the United States forced saving 
was 3.3 pp of GDP (around 50% of the rise in saving 
during 2020 in the country; see Chart 2). The fact that this 
saving component is larger in the euro area is consistent 
with the more stringent restrictions on mobility in the 
region compared with the United States.2
This analysis also highlights the notable contribution to 
household saving growth in the United States by the 
increase in households’ disposable income, up 7% in 
2020, supported by the significant direct transfers to 
them.3 By contrast, in the euro area, household income 
held roughly stable over the year as a whole despite being 
buoyed by the public support measures. Lastly, there has 
also been an increase in precautionary saving in both 
areas owing to uncertainty over the course of the health 
and economic situation. This uncertainty was more 
evident in the United States, perhaps in part due to the 
lower social protection afforded to US citizens. In 
particular, according to the model, this saving component 
would account for 1.1 pp of GDP of the increase in US 
saving, compared with 0.2 pp of GDP in the euro area.
Looking ahead, progress in the vaccination campaign and 
the gradual remission of the pandemic will likely give rise 
to the progressive lifting of restrictions on movement, 
leading to the normalisation of household consumption 
and saving patterns to levels more in keeping with those 
observed pre-crisis. The containment observed during 
the crisis in the consumption of services entailing greater 
social interaction could lead to a significant upturn in 
demand during this new phase, particularly in relation to 
travel, hospitality and other leisure activities. Meanwhile, 
insofar as the normalisation of activity and the economic 
recovery help dissipate agents’ uncertainty, there should 
also be a gradual release of precautionary saving. The 
demand for consumer durables, which usually contracts 
when uncertainty increases, might also be expected to 
rebound in the short term as uncertainty abates. Indeed, 
as Chart 3 shows, the demand for such goods has picked 
up in the United States in recent months while in the euro 
area it is below pre-pandemic levels, which is consistent 
with an earlier and sharper recovery of the US economy. 
Against this background, surveys on household 
expenditure intentions point to a favourable performance 
of consumption in the coming quarters in both areas (see 
Charts 4 and 5). Thus, in the United States, household 
expenditure intentions for the next 12 months have been 
quickening since mid-April 2020, for all income levels, and 
stand, on average, 1 pp above the pre-pandemic level. In 
the euro area, meantime, large-value purchase plans are 
also trending positively, although they are only above pre-
crisis levels in the case of high-income households.
In any event, the intensity of the release of built-up saving 
that might occur in the short term is subject to high 
uncertainty and will be conditional upon several factors. 
First, the households that have saved most during this 
crisis have been those with higher income levels, which 
This early-release box was published on 11 June
Box 3
OUTLOOK FOR HOUSEHOLD SAVING IN THE EURO AREA AND IN THE UNITED STATES
Irma Alonso, Fructuoso Borrallo and Daniel Santabárbara
1  Error correction model for household consumption, based on A. del Río and J. A. Cuenca (2020), “Euro area household income and saving during the 
first wave of the pandemic”, Economic Bulletin, 1/2021, Banco de España. The explanatory variables in the long-term equation are income, wealth 
and interest rates. Uncertainty is a short-term contemporaneous factor, which is proxied in the euro area by consumer confidence and in the United 
States by changes in the unemployment rate. See also J. A. Cuenca, C. Martínez Carrascal and A. del Río (2021). “Household saving during the 
pandemic and its possible effects on the future recovery in consumption”, Box  4 of the “Quarterly report on the Spanish economy”, Economic Bulletin, 
1/2021, Banco de España.
2  See M. Diakonova and A. del Río (2021). “Some determinants of the growth differential between the euro area and the United States since the onset 
of the pandemic”, Box  2 of the “Quarterly report on the Spanish economy”, Economic Bulletin, 2/2021, Banco de España. 
3  See L. Cuadro Sáez, F. López Vicente, S. Párraga Rodríguez and F. Viani (2020). Fiscal policy measures in response to the health crisis in the main 
euro area economies, the United States and the United Kingdom, Occasional Paper No 2019, Banco de España.
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Box 3
OUTLOOK FOR HOUSEHOLD SAVING IN THE EURO AREA AND IN THE UNITED STATES (cont’d)
SOURCES: Bureau of Economic Analysis, European Commission, Eurostat, OECD, New York Fed and own data.
a Data for Germany, France, Italy and the Netherlands.
b Simulations using the NiGEM model. The shock to consumption lasts for a year and the results correspond to the contemporaneous effects on GDP. 
As regards the technical assumptions, monetary policy is assumed to be exogenous, nominal exchange rates hold constant and agents' 
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Box 3
OUTLOOK FOR HOUSEHOLD SAVING IN THE EURO AREA AND IN THE UNITED STATES (cont’d)
have a lower propensity to consume.4 Second, a sizeable 
portion of the saving built up since the outbreak of the 
pandemic has stemmed from not consuming specific 
services of a non-deferrable nature (such as those related, 
for instance, to restaurants). That poses doubts over the 
scale of any future rebound in the consumption of these 
types of services. Finally, households might decide to 
maintain a high level of saving over a longer period, e.g. if 
they perceive a worsening income outlook owing to the 
relatively persistent scarring that the current crisis might 
cause to economic activity, or if they expect future tax 
rises owing to the current high public debt. 
For an idea of the potential impact on economic activity of 
the future saving rate normalisation, we set out below 
different hypothetical scenarios simulated using a 
macroeconometric model.5 Specifically, the model 
simulates the impact of a reduction in the reservoir of 
forced saving built up in 2020 in the United States and the 
euro area, calibrated such that this entails, in one year, a 
1% increase in private consumption in each of these 
economies.6 The results of the models suggest that this 
release of saving would, that same year, raise GDP in the 
euro area and in the United States by 0.4% and 0.6%, 
respectively (see Chart 6). The effect is more marked in 
the United States since, in this economy, consumption 
has a greater share in GDP, agents show a greater 
propensity to consume and the household consumption 
basket has a smaller imported content. One should 
highlight that a portion of these estimated impacts on 
activity arises from the interrelatedness of both regions. 
Specifically, one-sixth of the estimated impulse to activity 
for the euro area – accounting for 0.07% of GDP – is due 
to the demand for European products generated by the 
increase in US consumption.
By way of further illustration, it is estimated that, if all of 
the accumulated saving identified as “forced” were to 
translate into consumption over the course of one year, 
both in the euro area and in the United States, their GDP 
would increase by 2.9% and 3.1%, respectively, in that 
period compared with an alternative scenario under which 
none of this saving were released. The impact would be 
similar in both cases, given that the higher US consumption 
multiplier – linked to the above-mentioned structural 
factors – would be offset by the higher estimated forced 
saving for the euro area. However, in the US case it should 
be considered that any future reduction in the bigger 
reservoir of precautionary saving built up might add an 
extra differential impulse to the increase in output.
4  See, for example, M. Ampudia, R. Cooper, J. Le Blanc and G. Zhu (2020), MPC Heterogeneity in Europe: Sources and Policy Implications, NBER 
Working Paper Series, no 25082.
5  Specifically, the NiGEM model of the National Institute of Economic and Social Research. The documentation for the model can be found at https://
nimodel.niesr.ac.uk/. In the simulations presented in this box, monetary policy is assumed to be exogenous, nominal exchange rates hold constant 
and agents show adaptive expectations.
6  This reduction in the saving accumulated would involve drawing down, in one year, approximately 12% and 22% of the forced saving reservoir 
estimated in 2020 for the euro area and the United States, respectively.
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On 1 June, the European Central Bank (ECB) published 
the results of the Survey on the Access to Finance of 
Enterprises (SAFE) in the euro area, which covers the 
period from October 2020 to March 2021. The survey 
asks firms, essentially small and medium-sized 
enterprises (SMEs), about developments over the 
preceding six months in their economic and financial 
situation, their external finance needs and the terms and 
conditions on which such financing has, or has not, been 
obtained. 
In the case of Spanish SMEs, the data of this latest 
round of the survey show that the decline in their activity, 
as a result of the weakness of the economic situation, 
continued, albeit at a lower rate than in the period from 
April to September 2020, during which the first wave of 
the pandemic took place. Thus, although the number of 
firms reporting higher turnover between October 2020 
and March 2021 was, for the third consecutive round, 
lower than the number reporting turnover declines, the 
difference between the two groups (the net percentage) 
narrowed significantly, to 35% (from 55% in the previous 
survey round; see Chart 1). These turnover developments, 
combined with the increase in (personnel and other) 
costs, led to a large number of firms reporting a decline 
in profits, although significantly fewer than in the 
previous round (43% versus 56%, in net terms), while in 
the euro area as a whole the number was lower (35%).
When asked about their main concern, the difficulty of 
finding customers was the one reported by the highest 
percentage of Spanish SMEs (24%, see Chart 2), while, in 
the euro area, this concern was in second place, narrowly 
behind the difficulty in finding skilled labour. In contrast, 
and despite the complex economic situation since the 
onset of the pandemic, access to finance was once again, 
of the concerns included in this question, the one cited by 
the lowest number of firms, both in Spain and in the euro 
area (10% and 9%, respectively, percentages similar to 
those recorded six months earlier). 
In this context, the proportion of Spanish SMEs applying 
for bank loans in the reference period stood at 29% (see 
Chart 3), somewhat higher than in the euro area as a 
whole (27%), although almost 20 percentage points (pp) 
down from the extraordinarily high percentage recorded in 
the previous round of the survey. That figure largely 
reflected the large-scale recourse by Spanish SMEs to the 
public guarantee facilities managed by the ICO that were 
set up in 2020 to mitigate the adverse effects of the 
pandemic on business liquidity. Also, SMEs’ perception of 
their access to bank finance continued to improve, albeit 
at a slightly lower rate than six months earlier (see Chart 4). 
As was the case in the previous round of the survey, the 
improvement in access to finance reported by firms 
contrasts with the deterioration they had anticipated for 
this period six months previously.
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It should be noted, moreover, that the improvement in 
access to finance continued to occur even though the 
number of SMEs considering that both the general 
economic situation and their specific situation were 
obstacles to obtaining new loans again exceeded those 
who considered the opposite. At the same time, 11% of 
Spanish SMEs perceived an improvement in the 
willingness of banks to lend (5 pp down from six months 
previously, but almost double the percentage recorded in 
the euro area), while access to public financial support 
had no impact, following its positive consideration in the 
previous round. 
SOURCE: ECB.
a Percentage of firms reporting an improvement minus percentage of firms reporting a deterioration.
b This indicator reflects the proportion of firms in one of the following situations: those whose applications for funds were rejected; those which were 
granted funds but only a limited amount; those which were granted a loan but at a cost they considered very high; and those which did not apply for 
finance for fear of rejection (discouraged from applying). The numbers on the horizontal axis depict the rounds of the survey, with 1 corresponding to 
the period April-September 2017 and 8 to the period October 2020-March 2021.
c Percentage of firms reporting an improvement in conditions (lower interest rates, increase in amounts and maturities, and lower collateral and other 
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In any event, despite the perception that access to bank 
finance has improved, 5% of SMEs’ loan applications 
were rejected in the period from October 2020 to March 
2021, up 2 pp on six months earlier and 1 pp higher than 
the rate recorded in the euro area as a whole.  In a similar 
vein, the broadest indicator of difficulty in obtaining bank 
loans1 worsened. Thus, the proportion of Spanish 
companies encountering difficulties of this kind increased 
by 3 pp, to 11% (compared with 8% in the euro area). This 
was mainly due to the increase in the number of firms that 
did not apply for financing because they believed it would 
not be granted to them (discouraged from applying) (see 
Chart  5). It should be noted in this connection that the 
reason for the apparent discrepancy between the changes 
in the indicator of access to bank finance and the indicator 
of difficulties in obtaining bank loans is mainly that while 
the former indicator comprises the perception of all firms, 
regardless of whether they had requested or wished to 
apply for financing, the second indicator is constructed 
solely on the basis of the information furnished by 
companies which had applied for loans or that would 
have liked to but did not because they believed the 
funding would not be granted to them (overall, these firms 
account for less than 50% of the total).
With regard to financing conditions, the net percentage of 
firms reporting an increase in interest rates grew 
significantly, to 14%, 10 pp more than six months earlier 
(see Chart 6). In addition, SMEs perceived once again, in 
net terms, a tightening of collateral requirements and of 
other loan terms and conditions other than size and 
maturity. In contrast, the net proportion of companies 
indicating an increase in loan amounts continued to be 
positive (14%, compared with 25% in the previous survey 
round), as was (even more so) that indicating a lengthening 
of maturities (25%, up 5 pp on six months earlier). This 
latter development appears to be linked to the extension 
of repayment periods for loans granted under the public 
guarantee scheme which was approved by the 
Government in November 2020.
Lastly, this round of the survey included a question on the 
impact of the different government support measures for 
firms adopted in response to the pandemic. In Spain, 
31% of the SMEs surveyed had access in the previous 12 
months to assistance to alleviate staff expenses, 14% 
had benefited from tax cuts and fiscal moratoria, and 21% 
had received other types of support, such as loan 
guarantees. In all three cases the percentages were below 
those reported for the euro area as a whole (48%, 25% 
and 32%, respectively). Also, a very high proportion of the 
Spanish SMEs that have received assistance (between 
71% and 87%, depending on the type of measure used) 
believe that these actions have contributed significantly to 
covering their liquidity needs in the short term. In contrast, 
most of the firms (63%) consider that the measures (in 
force or envisaged) aiming to reduce solvency risks in the 
medium term will not have a significant impact on their 
debt repayment ability.
In short, the latest round of the SAFE shows that from 
October 2020 to March 2021 the activity of Spanish SMEs 
continued to deteriorate, albeit more moderately than in 
the previous round. Against this backdrop of economic 
weakness, SMEs as a whole perceive that their access to 
external financing has continued to improve, although the 
proportion of firms that have experienced difficulties in 
obtaining such financing has increased. SMEs also 
signalled a slight increase in interest rates and a tightening 
of collateral requirements, although they reported that 
other financing conditions had evolved more favourably, 
particularly loan maturities.
1  This indicator reflects one or more of the following situations: rejected loan applications; loan applications for which only a limited amount was granted; 
loan applications which resulted in an offer that was declined by the SME because the borrowing costs were too high; and cases where SMEs did not 
apply for a loan for fear of rejection.
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Since the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic, the outlook 
for economic activity in the short term has been subject to 
extraordinary uncertainty. Specifically, the exceptional 
nature of this shock (which is completely unconnected to 
previous economic dynamics), the marked severity of its 
economic and social impact and the extraordinary nature 
of the measures rolled out to contain the spread of the 
virus and mitigate its adverse effects on economic activity 
have posed considerable challenges for short and 
medium-term macroeconomic forecasting.
Addressing these challenges has required significant 
changes in the way projection exercises are conducted.1 
Thus, for instance, since the outbreak of the health 
crisis numerous institutions (including the Banco de 
España), in an attempt to reflect the high uncertainty 
that has characterised the macroeconomic and 
epidemiological setting, have opted to draw up a 
number of alternative scenarios on the basis of different 
assumptions as to the course of the pandemic, the 
severity of the containment measures and, in some 
cases, other factors such as the effectiveness of 
economic policies. Moreover, in these exceptionally 
volatile circumstances, the use of various high-
frequency indicators – for example, relating to changes 
in mobility, electricity consumption or card payments – 
has gained importance in projection exercises. These 
indicators provide almost-real-time signals on the 
dynamism of economic activity, as opposed to the more 
usual monthly activity indicators. However, high-
frequency indicators generally provide a noisier signal 
and are, therefore, less useful in ordinary times when 
economic activity shows greater inertia. 
Despite these methodological innovations, forecasting 
economic activity in the short term is still an extraordinarily 
complex task, as evidenced by the larger-than-usual 
forecasting errors observed since the beginning of 2020. 
This can be seen in Chart 1, which shows, from 2016, the 
deviation between the GDP growth rate for the current 
quarter estimated in the Banco de España’s projection 
exercises and the rate published by the National Statistics 
Institute (INE) in its flash Quarterly National Accounts 
estimate. Indeed, since 2020 Q1, taking as reference the 
baseline scenario of the Banco de España’s projections, 
the average quarterly forecasting error in absolute terms 
was one percentage point (pp), well above the deviation 
of 0.1 pp observed on average for 2016-2019.2
In this setting, this box explores to what extent the recently 
observed larger forecasting errors may have been 
influenced by the behaviour of economic activity between 
the cut-off date in each of these projection exercises and 
the end of the quarter for which GDP is estimated. In 
particular, the hypothesis assumed is that, since the onset 
of the pandemic, in an exceptionally volatile economic 
and health situation, not having information on activity for 
the last weeks of the quarter (from the projection cut-off 
date onwards) could have played a very significant part in 
the forecasting errors observed, especially compared with 
other quarters prior to the pandemic when economic 
activity was much less volatile.
To assess the validity of this hypothesis, this box uses an 
indicator developed by the Banco de España, specifically 
the Daily Economic News Sentiment Indicator (DENSI). 
This indicator aims to measure changes in economic 
sentiment in Spain drawing on news in the press, and is 
able to approximate, with noise but practically in real time, 
the behaviour of GDP in the short term.3 Using the DENSI, 
which is a daily indicator, it is possible to construct a 
measure that approximates the changes occurring in the 
behaviour of economic activity in the time elapsed 
between the cut-off date for each of the Banco de 
España’s projection exercises and the relevant quarter-
end. In other words, the DENSI provides for an assessment 
of significant changes in economic activity in the final 
stretch of the quarter in which the forecasts are drawn up, 
that could not be taken into account in the projection 
exercise as the changes occurred after the cut-off date.
Chart 2 shows, for each projection exercise, the number 
of days between the cut-off date for the projections and 
the quarter-end, while Chart 3 depicts the average change 




Pablo Aguilar, Samuel Hurtado and Alberto Urtasun
1  See M. Izquierdo (2021), “Developments in the projections of the main macroeconomic variables in 2020”, Box 8, “Quarterly Report on the Spanish 
Economy”, Economic Bulletin 1/2021, Banco de España.
2  Since the spring of 2020, the Banco de España has been publishing several scenarios (usually three) in each projection exercise. The exception was 
the September Quarterly Report, when only two scenarios were published; in that case, what was then referred to as scenario 1 is considered the 
baseline scenario.
3  See P. Aguilar, C. Ghirelli, M. Pacce and A. Urtasun (2021), “Can news help measure economic sentiment? An application in COVID-19 times”, 
Economics Letters, Vol. 199.




in the DENSI during that period, where a positive change 
denotes an improvement in sentiment.4 In the light of this 
evidence, two aspects can be highlighted. First, that in 
the June and December projection exercises, the Broad 
Macroeconomic Projection Exercises (BMPE) that are 
conducted jointly with the other Eurosystem national 
central banks, the forecasts are generally drawn up earlier 
in the quarter. Since in these exercises the period between 
the cut-off date for the projections and the quarter-end is 
longer, the DENSI is more likely to reflect more significant 
changes that were not taken into account when the 
projections were made.
SOURCES: INE and Banco de España.
a Difference between the quarter-on-quarter GDP growth rate published by INE in its flash QNA estimate and the rate forecast by the Banco de España 
in its macroeconomic projection exercise.
b Difference between the DENSI calculated with all the information for the quarter and that calculated solely with the information available at the 
projections cut-off date. Normalised to the scale of the GDP forecasting errors, in percentage points.
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Chart 3
DENSI REVISION BETWEEN PROJECTIONS CUT-OFF DATE AND QUARTER-END (b)
4  Calculated as the difference between the average of the DENSI for the full quarter and the average for the days elapsed in the quarter up to the cut-off 
date for the projection exercise. In the case of 2020 Q1, faced with the exceptional situation caused by the onset of the pandemic, the Banco de 
España decided to delay the publication of its forecasts from March, when they are traditionally published, to April. In consequence, in that case, the 
cut-off date for the projection exercise was after the quarter-end, and hence the change in the DENSI was zero.




Second, consistent with the considerable volatility in 
economic activity perceived since the start of the health 
crisis, the changes observed in the DENSI between the 
cut-off date for the projections and the quarter-end have 
been much greater than those observed in pre-pandemic 
exercises. This is especially true for the projection 
exercises conducted in June and December 2020. As 
Chart 4 shows, the fact that, in those periods, the quarter-
end information, which was not included in the analysis, 
pointed to a clear improvement in economic activity 
explains, to a certain extent, the underestimation in those 
projection exercises of the GDP growth rate in the current 
quarter.
To sum up, the analysis presented here highlights the fact 
that, since the start of the pandemic, against the backdrop 
of high volatility in economic activity, the number of days 
between the cut-off date for the projection exercise and 
the quarter-end appears to have had a significant impact 
on the accuracy of the forecasts for the GDP growth rate 
in the short term. In the specific case of the short-term 
projections for the GDP growth rate in the current quarter, 
this analysis may also reveal the cost incurred, in terms of 
lower forecasting accuracy, as a result of their being drawn 
up and published considerably in advance of the official 
GDP flash estimates that the INE publishes approximately 
30 days after the close of the corresponding quarter.
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In 2020, CO2 emissions in Spain fell by 17.4%.
1 This 
reduction, which was also observed in the European Union 
(EU) and worldwide (with falls in emissions of 10.4% and 
6.2%, respectively), was mainly due to the COVID-19 
pandemic and the effects that the measures rolled out to 
contain it had on economic activity in general and on 
certain sectors (most notably transportation) in particular. 
Indeed, most of the fall in CO2 emissions in Spain arose in 
the second half of March and in April, after the first state 
of alert was declared on 14 March, with the introduction of 
the most stringent restrictions on people’s movement and 
the activity of certain sectors (see Chart 1). Since then, the 
gradual easing of these confinement measures led to an 
equally gradual increase in emissions, although they have 
not yet returned to pre-crisis levels.
In addition, Chart 2 shows that in 2020 the largest 
reductions in CO2 emissions occurred in international and 
domestic air transport. This was also the case in the EU-28 
as a whole and is consistent with the sharp decline in 
activity recorded in this sector since the onset of the 
pandemic, mainly due to restrictions on movement and a 
voluntary reduction in travel. CO2 emissions linked to the 
land transport sector and industry also declined very 
significantly in the early stages of the pandemic (somewhat 
more sharply than in the EU in the case of land transport). 
However, unlike in the air transport sector, they have 
already returned to levels similar to those prior to the 
health crisis. In contrast to these developments, carbon 
dioxide emissions in the residential sector showed no 
noticeable year-on-year deviations in 2020, whereas 
energy sector emissions over virtually the entire year, 
including before the pandemic, were lower than in 2019, 
recording an annual average fall of 22%.
There is evidence, however, that not all of the decline in 
CO2 emissions in 2020 was linked to the adverse effects 
on economic activity of the pandemic and the lockdown 
measures. For example, in the particular case of the 
Spanish electricity sector, which accounts for around 
20% of the economy’s total emissions, some studies 
suggest that a significant part of the decline in its 
emissions over 2020 was due to structural as well as 
transitory factors unrelated to the pandemic. Specifically, 
Fabra et al (2021)2 have estimated the emissions that the 
Spanish electricity sector would have generated over the 
past year in a hypothetical scenario of no pandemic, using 
This early-release box was published on 4 June
Box 6
RECENT CHANGES IN CO2 EMISSIONS IN SPAIN
María de los Llanos Matea, Aitor Lacuesta and Darío Serrano-Puente
SOURCE: Carbon Monitor.
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Chart 1 
CO2 EMISSIONS IN SPAIN (a)
7-day moving average
1  According to data provided by Carbon Monitor for the energy, industrial, residential and air and land transport sectors. Over the course of 2020, total 
emissions decreased by around 47 million tonnes.
2  See N. Fabra, A. Lacuesta and M. Souza (2020), “Degrowth versus Decoupling: Competing strategies for carbon abatement?”, EnergyEcoLab, 109.
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Box 6
RECENT CHANGES IN CO2 EMISSIONS IN SPAIN (cont’d)
SOURCE: Carbon Monitor.
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Chart 2 
CO2 EMISSIONS THROUGHOUT 2020 IN SPAIN AND THE EU-28 (a) 
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Box 6
RECENT CHANGES IN CO2 EMISSIONS IN SPAIN (cont’d)
a model that includes most of the technical and institutional 
parameters of electricity market auctions. Specifically, the 
authors concluded that 64% of the reduction in this 
sector’s CO2 emissions in 2020 (equivalent to 17% of the 
decrease in emissions observed in the economy as a 
whole) appears to be unrelated to economic activity. 
Drivers behind this decline include the closure of coal-
fired power plants and weather conditions in 2020, which 
was particularly wet and sunny compared with 2019, and 
increased investment in renewable energy, all of which 
altered the relative share of the different sources of 
electricity generation. Specifically, as a result of these 
factors, hydroelectric and photovoltaic power production, 
whose level of CO2 emissions is relatively low, increased 
by 42% and 71%, respectively, in 2020.
Looking ahead, in keeping with the EU’s global leadership 
of the fight against climate change in recent years, Spain 
has just committed to attaining very ambitious goals over 
the coming decades in terms of reducing greenhouse gas 
emissions, developing renewable energy sources and 
increasing energy efficiency.3 Achieving these goals will 
foreseeably require very profound changes in agents’ 
behaviour patterns and in the current growth model. Such 
a structural transformation should be helped by the 
implementation over the coming years of the NGEU 
programme in Spain.
In any event, until the different climate-change public 
policies that will be implemented in the short and medium 
term are sufficiently defined, it may be useful to determine 
what other factors, aside from the COVID-19 pandemic, 
have influenced CO2 emissions in Spain in recent decades. 
In this regard, Chart 3, based on Serrano-Puente (2021),4 
indicates that the increase in the share of renewables in 
the energy mix between 2007 and 2018 was one of the 
factors that contributed the most to falling final energy 
consumption-related CO2 emissions (a drop of 19%, 
compared with 11% in the EU-28). The changes in the 
sectoral composition of the Spanish economy between 
2007 and 2018, in line with, for example, a greater 
tertiarisation of activity, also contributed significantly to 
this reduction.
Conversely, and unlike in the EU-28 between 2007 and 
2018, the scant improvement in energy efficiency in 
Spain stands out. According to the evidence provided in 
the Ministry of Energy, Tourism and Digital Agenda’s 
SOURCE: Serrano-Puente (2021).
a Emissions in Spain fell by 19% between 2007 and 2018. In the chart, a bar of -10% (10%) for a given factor means that this factor has reduced 
(increased) total emisions by 1.9%.
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Chart 3 
STRUCTURAL FACTORS BEHIND THE DECREASE IN EMISSIONS BETWEEN 2007 AND 2018 (a)
3  See Ley 7/2021, de 20 de mayo, de cambio climático y transición energética (Climate Change and Energy Transition Law 7/2021 of 20 May 2021, 
only available in Spanish).
4  See D. Serrano-Puente (2021), “Are we moving toward an energy-efficient low-carbon economy? An input–output LMDI decomposition of CO2 
emissions for Spain and the EU28”, SERIEs.
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Box 6
RECENT CHANGES IN CO2 EMISSIONS IN SPAIN (cont’d)
2017-2020 National Energy Efficiency Action Plan, this 
would not necessarily be linked to technically inefficient 
equipment. Rather, it would in part be due to such 
equipment being somewhat underused in the decade 
following the global financial crisis. In this regard, in 
periods of lower economic activity, the energy consumed 
by the different sectors would not decrease in proportion 
to activity, since, despite operating below its capacity, the 
fixed energy consumption of such equipment would 
continue to be relatively high.5
5  By way of illustration, consider a machine that consumes a significant amount of energy when starting up (fixed energy consumption) and a relatively 
small amount of energy for each unit of output produced. In this particular case, the energy consumption per unit of output will be higher (lower) in 
periods of low (high) output.
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In recent months, optimism has been the prevailing sentiment in international 
financial markets, fuelled by the improvement in the health situation, 
headway in the vaccination campaigns and the favourable performance of 
economic indicators. However, uncertainty over the persistence of the pick-up 
in inflation in many economies since the beginning of the year and the 
ensuing doubts in the markets as to the duration of the current expansionary 




States),	 the	 easing	 of	 the	 pandemic-containment	 measures	 in	 light	 of	 the	
improved	health	 situation	 and	 the	 relatively	widespread	upward	 revision	of	
economic	growth	expectations.	The rally in stock markets in the year to date has 
seen new record highs in the S&P 500 index, the FTSE 250 and EURO STOXX 50 
indices exceeding January 2020 levels, and a significant rise in the IBEX 35 (see 
Chart 3.1). Notable amid this high sectoral heterogeneity was the rise in the banking 
sector. In any case, uncertainty over the persistence of the recent rebound in inflation 
in some countries, the possibility of overheating in the US economy in the short term 
and the emergence of new COVID-19 variants have caused some bouts of volatility 
in recent months. 
In	Q2,	long-term	sovereign	bond	yields	rose	in	the	euro	area	countries. At the 
cut-off date of this Report, the yield on the 10-year German Bund had risen by 10 bp 
over the quarter to its highest level since mid-2019 (see Chart 3.2). By contrast, after 
increasing strongly at the start of the year, yields on equivalent bonds in the United 
States and the United Kingdom have hardly moved in the quarter to date. This 
divergence in sovereign bond yields between the United States and the euro area 
may have at least partly borne on the recent depreciation of the US dollar against the 
euro. Sovereign risk premia in the euro area have increased in Italy, Portugal and 
France (by 13 bp, 12 bp and 12 bp, respectively, although in the latter two cases this 
increase was partly due to a change in the related benchmark bond), decreased in 
Greece (by 5 bp) and remained virtually unchanged in Spain. 
Improved	macroeconomic	expectations	and	positive	market	sentiment	have	
provided	for	a	continuing	falling	trend	in	corporate	bond	spreads	in	the	euro	
area,	especially	in	the	high-yield	segment (see Chart 3.3). Despite this, financing 
costs in euro area corporate bond markets have risen in recent months owing to the 
pick-up in risk-free interest rates. Corporate bond issuance continued to increase 
2 INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL MARKETS
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this quarter, although it remains below the volumes posted in previous years in the 
investment-grade segment, probably owing to firms’ lower financing needs after the 
high volume of funds raised in 2020.
There	 have	 been	 no	 major	 developments	 in	 the	 financial	 markets	 of	 the	
emerging	 economies	 in	 recent	 months (see Chart 3.4). In particular, local-
currency-denominated sovereign bond yields have risen more slowly than in 
previous months and there have been moderate portfolio capital inflows and a slight 
decline in the volume of issues, particularly sovereign issues. In any event, apart 
In 2021 Q2, stock market indices rose in the advanced countries against the backdrop of an improved health situation, progress in 
vaccination campaigns and the favourable performance of economic indicators. Long-term public debt yields increased in the euro area and 
remained relatively stable in other advanced economies. Spreads continued to narrow in corporate bond markets, especially in the high-yield 
segment. In emerging market economies, financial markets have shown no significant changes in recent months.
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from these dynamics, there is some concern over the possibility of a potential 
overheating of the US economy, which could lead to a tightening of financial 
conditions for those emerging market economies with greater fiscal or external 
vulnerability. 
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3.1 External environment of the euro area
While the global economy has continued to grow in 2021 to date, it has done 
so at a slightly slower pace than in 2020 Q4 and with evident cross-country 
heterogeneity. This is due to uneven epidemiological developments and 
differing degrees of economic policy support.
The	 recovery	 in	 global	 economic	 activity	 continued	 in	 2021	 Q1,	 albeit	 at	 a	
slower	pace	than	in	2020	Q4	and	with	notable	differences	among	the	world’s	
main	 economies. The uneven course of the pandemic and different rates of 
vaccination globally placed constraints on the ability to ease the health measures 
implemented to contain the disease in each country and, therefore, to press forward 
with the return to normal in activity (see Charts 4.1 and 4.2). GDP contracted by 0.6% 
in the euro area, 1.3% in Japan and 1.5% in the United Kingdom in 2021 Q1. It also 
slowed sharply in the emerging economies, affecting above all Asia due to the 
worsening of the pandemic in some countries, such as India, and to the gradual 
deceleration in China’s growth rate. Conversely, the United States recorded a marked 
acceleration in its growth rate in the same period (up to 1.6% quarter-on-quarter), 
thanks to economic policy support − in particular the fiscal stimulus packages − and 
to headway with the vaccination campaign (see Chart 4.3). The United States will be 
one of the few economies to close the output gap in 2021. Global trade continued to 
grow during this period, albeit at a more moderate pace. Particularly of note is the 
fall-off in trade between the EU and the United Kingdom. This would partly reflect 
short-term Brexit-related disruptions.
The	high	frequency	indicators	for	Q2	suggest	that	the	recovery	will	continue	
in	 both	 manufacturing	 and	 services. In recent months, headway with the 
vaccination campaign is prompting the gradual lifting of containment measures and 
the return to normal economic activity in developed countries. These developments 
appear to be reflected in improved output, expenditure and employment. However, 
the current output gap in those economies is still very wide and, except for the 
United States, the IMF expects closing the gap to be a relatively slow process (see 
Chart 4.4 and Box 3 on the outlook for consumption and saving behaviour). In the 
emerging regions hardest hit by outbreaks of the pandemic, such as India and Latin 
America, growth in Q2 is likely to be smaller than previously expected.
Inflation	rates	have	picked	up	substantially	in	the	early	months	of	2021,	driven	
by	 the	base	effects	 linked	to	 the	steep	decline	 in	prices	 in	2020	and	higher	
3	 EXTERNAL	ENVIRONMENT	OF	THE	SPANISH	ECONOMY
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While the global economy continued its recovery in 2021 Q1, it did so at a slower pace and with evident cross-country heterogeneity. This 
largely reflects the uneven course of the pandemic. Growth seems to have quickened in Q2, underpinned by the gradual reopening of the 
economies and economic policy. Inflation rose, driven by the base effects amplifying the effects of higher energy, food and some input prices.
THE IMPACT OF THE COVID-19 PANDEMIC ON WORLD ECONOMIC ACTIVITY
Chart 4
SOURCES: Consensus Forecast, IMF, Google, Johns Hopkins University - Coronavirus Resource Center, JP Morgan and Thomson Reuters.
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energy,	 food	 and	 some	 intermediate	 goods	 prices (see Charts 4.5 and 4.6). 
Growth in aggregate demand, prompted by the reopening of the economies and the 
gradual recovery in activity, has coincided, in some cases, with supply-side problems 
associated with the emergence of bottlenecks in the supply of certain inputs. This 
has resulted in the prices of some products increasing significantly. While this type 
of imbalance tends to be temporary, the adjustment between supply and demand 
may not be immediate in some sectors, such as the semiconductor industry 
(semiconductors are a key component for the automobile industry and the production 
of electronic equipment). In any event, the combined action of the aforementioned 
factors has given rise to a marked increase in inflation rates, which, in some cases, 





However, in some emerging economies the central banks seem to regard the 
monetary easing cycle as having ended in Q1. For instance, in Brazil and Russia, the 
monetary authorities decided to raise the policy interest rates between March and 
May in order to prevent the higher prices from resulting in a deanchoring of inflation 
expectations and ultimately feeding through to the core components. Looking 
ahead, the risk of certain emerging economies undergoing some turbulence, as a 
result of a potential tightening of global financing conditions amid an unsynchronised 
exit from the crisis, will hinge on the relative degree of macrofinancial vulnerability. 
Broadly speaking, they would currently be less vulnerable than in other previous 
recessions in terms of external imbalances and the banking sector. However, in 




as	a	whole.	The initiatives proposed in March and April 2021 (the American Jobs 
Plan and the American Families Plan) will essentially raise public investment in 
infrastructure, government spending on education and social benefits for 
households over the next ten years. If approved as is in 2021, such increase in 
spending would total approximately $4 trillion and would be partially financed 
through tax hikes for the highest income firms and households. These plans are 
expected to increase growth in the United States while having certain positive 
spillover effects on the rest of the world.1
1 For an analysis of the impact of previous US fiscal packages, see Box 3, “Quarterly report on the Spanish 
economy”, Economic Bulletin, 1/2021, Banco de España.
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3.2 The euro area
In 2021 Q2, the strides made in the vaccination campaign and improved 
epidemiological developments appear to be enabling the resumption of the 
economic recovery path after the declines recorded in activity in the two 
previous quarters. Inflation’s current upward trajectory largely reflects 
temporary factors whose effects will foreseeably dissipate as the year 
unfolds. While economic slack remains high, significant core inflationary 
pressures have so far gone undetected.
Economic	activity	in	the	euro	area	worsened	again	in	the	early	months	of	the	
year,	amid	the	prolongation	of	the	pandemic	containment	measures	launched	
following	the	deterioration	in	the	health	situation	at	end-2020. Euro area GDP 
contracted by 0.3% in 2021 Q1 as a result of the fall-off in private consumption, 
partially offset by stockbuilding (see Charts 5.1 and 5.2). However, it must be borne 
in mind that this figure was boosted by the high growth recorded by Ireland in that 
period (7.8%). Thus, excluding Ireland from the euro area aggregate, euro area GDP 
would have fallen by 0.6% in 2021 Q1, a figure similar to that recorded in 2020 Q4. 
The increase in Ireland’s sales abroad and the steep drop in its imports also impacted 
net external demand’s slightly positive contribution to the euro area’s quarterly 
growth. By sector, the services hardest hit by the pandemic containment measures 
once again bore the brunt of the decline in activity, although the recovery in 
manufacturing activity also slowed due to the emergence of some bottlenecks in the 
supply of certain intermediate goods affecting above all the automobile industry. 
The	 latest	 activity	 indicators	 suggest	 that	 in	 the	 spring	 euro	 area	 GDP	
returned	to	the	path	of	economic	recovery	that	was	interrupted	in	2020	Q4 
(see Chart 5.3). In recent months, the strides made in the domestic vaccination 
campaigns and improved epidemiological developments have prompted a 
gradual easing of the pandemic containment measures. This appears to have 
enabled slight growth in consumption and the activity of services. However, this 
seems to have been uneven across countries. For example, the latest information 
on the European Commission’s confidence indicators and the Purchasing 
Managers’ Indices, with a widespread increase by sector and by country, 
seemingly points in this direction. Other manifold factors also seem to be 
underpinning the upturn in activity. These notably include the improvement in 
foreign trade, the continued expansionary stance of the ECB’s monetary policy 
and the prolongation of the fiscal stimulus packages, with the launch of the 
NGEU-funded investment plans. Even so, in the near term the euro area’s 
recovery is expected to be slower than in other geographical areas (see Box 2, 
on the determinants of the growth differential between the euro area and the 
United States during the pandemic).
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The	June	Eurosystem	staff	Broad	Macroeconomic	Projection	Exercise2 (BMPE)	
revised	GDP	growth	upwards	for	the	euro	area	to	4.6%	in	2021	and	4.7%	in	2022.	
As compared with the March exercise, in the early stages of the year activity in the 
euro area (excluding Ireland) behaved less dynamically than expected and oil prices 
were higher. However, these factors have been offset by a more dynamic international 
environment,3 owing to an improved short-term outlook, linked to the progress of 
vaccination efforts and the stimulus of the new fiscal measures adopted by euro area 
governments (primarily through increased transfers to firms and households). These 
projections are somewhat more optimistic than those of other international 
organisations and private analysts for 2021 and 2022 (see Table 2). The exercise notes 
that the projections remain subject to greater uncertainty than usual (albeit less than 
during the early stages of the health crisis) owing to three hard-to-calibrate aspects: 
the epidemiological course of the pandemic itself, consumer behaviour as regards use 
of the reservoir of savings built up since the onset of the crisis (see Box 3), and the 
scarring effects of a crisis that has persisted for longer than initially expected. 
2 See Eurosystem staff macroeconomic projections for the euro area, June 2021.
3 The June BMPE factors in the American Rescue Plan approved in March (which was not included in the March 
projections exercise) and the two US fiscal packages subsequently announced but not yet approved (the American 
Jobs Plan and the American Families Plan).
Economic activity was impacted by the deteriorating health situation at the start of the year and the widespread prolongation of the containment 
measures. This had an adverse impact on private consumption, particularly in Germany. GDP is expected to start on a recovery path from April, with 
robust growth in 2021 H2.
THE EURO AREA ECONOMY CONTRACTED AGAIN IN Q1
Chart 5
SOURCES: Eurostat, Markit Economics, ECB and national central banks.
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In	the	fiscal	policy	arena,	the	Stability	Programmes	submitted	by	the	Member	
States	in	April	point	to	a	continuation	of	the	measures	to	support	activity. The 
BMPE expects the euro area deficit to stand at 7.3% of GDP in 2021 (down 0.2 pp 
on 2020) and to subsequently shrink to just over 3% in 2022, primarily due to the 
withdrawal of the stimulus programmes and the economic recovery taking hold. At 
the cut-off date of this Report, 23 countries have submitted their recovery and 
resilience plans – linked to use of NGEU funds –, which must be approved by the 
European institutions within three months of their receipt.
The	rise	in	headline	inflation,	which	began	early	in	the	year,	continued,	affected	
by	 various	 temporary	 factors.	 In May, headline inflation climbed to 2%, driven 
mainly by the energy component and, to a lesser extent, by services. Core inflation 
rose to 0.9% (see Charts 6.1 and 6.2). Among the most prominent factors conditioning 
the course of inflation since the beginning of the year are the reversal, in January, of 
the temporary VAT reduction in Germany, the rise in energy prices, the postponement 
of the sales period in some countries, and changes in the HICP consumption basket 
weights.
Against	 a	 background	 in	 which	 there	 is	 still	 a	 high	 degree	 of	 slack	 in	 the	
economy	and	the	recovery	of	aggregate	demand	remains	weak,	no	significant	
inflationary	pressure	is	expected	in	the	years	ahead.	The June BMPE expects 
the average inflation rate to rise to 1.9% in 2021 (up from 0.3% in 2020) and to 
subsequently ease to 1.5% in 2022 and 1.4% in 2023 (see Table 2). As has been 
noted, the pick-up in inflation in 2021 appears to broadly reflect the impact of various 
idiosyncratic and temporary factors which will gradually dissipate over the course of 
the year. Accordingly, the projections for core inflation point to moderate growth in 
2021 (1.1%) and a gradual increase to 1.4% in 2023. Market-based inflation 
expectation indicators remain well short of the medium-term reference levels of 2%, 
despite the rebound in recent months from the lows reached in 2020 (see Chart 6.3).
EURO AREA GDP AND HICP GROWTH FORECASTS (a)
Table 2
SOURCES: ECB, European Commission, Consensus Forecast, IMF and OECD.
a In brackets is the change with respect to the previous forecast, which was March for the ECB, February for the European Commission, March for 
the OECD, January for the IMF and April for Consensus Forecast.
320222021202
GDP  HIPC GDP  HIPC GDP  HIPC
0)( 4.1)0( 1.20.3)( 5.1)6.0( 7.4)3.0( 9.1)6.0( 4.6ECB (June 2021)
)0( 3.1)6.0( 4.4)3.0( 7.1)5.0( 3.4European Commission (May 2021)
)…( 3.1)6.0( 4.4)…( 8.1)4.0( 3.4OECD (May 2021)
)…( 9.1)…( 2.1)2.0( 8.3)…( 4.1)2.0( 4.4IMF (April 2021)
)0( 3.1)0( 3.4)1.0( 7.1)0( 2.4Consensus Forecast (May 2021)
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At	its	most	recent	monetary	policy	meeting	in	June,	the	ECB	Governing	Council	
decided	to	reconfirm	its	very	accommodative	monetary	policy	stance.	Thus, in 
Q3, net asset purchases under the pandemic emergency purchase programme 
(PEPP) will continue at a significantly higher pace than in the initial months of this 
year. As with the April meeting, policy interest rates were left unchanged and no 
additional changes were made to the design of the asset purchase programmes or 
refinancing operations. Following these decisions, the market does not expect the 
key policy rates to change over the coming quarters.
Financing	 conditions	 for	 the	 non-financial	 private	 sector	 remain	 loose,	
although	credit	 standards	continued	 to	 tighten	 in	Q1.	According to the Bank 
Lending Survey (BLS), this tightening was moderate and affected both consumer 
credit and other lending to households and lending to firms. If banks’ expectations 
prove accurate, this pattern may have continued in Q2 and extended to loans for 
house purchase (see Chart 7.1). Nevertheless, the latest round of the survey of euro 
area SMEs on their access to financing does not signal a deterioration in the 
availability of bank loans in the period from October 2020 to March 2021 (see Box 4). 
The average cost of loans declined further, although marginally, reaching near-
record lows in most segments in April. By contrast, the cost to firms of long-term 
The pick-up in inflation in recent months has broadly been linked to temporary factors, such as rising energy prices, the end of the German 
VAT reduction, the changes in weights and the postponement of the sales period. However, core inflation remains low. Inflation expectations 
are holding at moderate levels, despite rising from the lows reached in 2020.
EURO AREA INFLATION REMAINS ON A RISING TRAJECTORY
Chart 6
SOURCES: Bloomberg, Eurostat and ECB.
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debt security issuance has climbed in recent months, in keeping with the increase 
observed in interest rates on long-term sovereign debt (see Chart 7.2). 
Against	this	background,	the	funding	raised	by	the	non-financial	private	
sector	has	behaved	more	dynamically	in	recent	months,	particularly	for	non-
financial	corporations.	Thus, the growth of bank lending to firms has quickened, 
while business financing through the issuance of debt securities recently returned 
to growth, having shrunk slightly at end-2020 and in early 2021. The pace of credit 
to households has also increased, albeit slightly, thanks to faster growth in lending 
for house purchase, the less pronounced decline in consumer credit and the 
recovery in other lending.
According to the Bank Lending Survey, in 2021 Q1 credit standards tightened again in most segments, albeit more moderately. If banks’ 
expectations prove accurate, this trend may have continued in Q2 and extended to all loan types. Overall, average interest rates on bank 
financing stand close to all-time lows. By contrast, the cost to firms of long-term debt security issuance has picked up in recent months, in 
keeping with yields on long-term sovereign debt.
FINANCING CONDITIONS REMAIN LOOSE, ALTHOUGH CREDIT STANDARDS APPEAR TO HAVE TIGHTENED AGAIN IN 2021 Q1
Chart 7
SOURCES: Refinitiv Datastream and ECB.
a Indicator = percentage of banks that have tightened credit standards considerably × 1 + percentage of banks that have tightened credit 
standards somewhat × 1/2 – percentage of banks that have eased credit standards somewhat × 1/2 – percentage of banks that have 
eased credit standards considerably × 1.
b Bank lending rates are NDERs (narrowly defined effective rates), i.e. they exclude related charges, such as repayment insurance 
premiums and fees. They are also trend-cycle interest rates, i.e. they are adjusted for seasonal and irregular components (small changes 
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The cost of bank borrowing for non-financial corporations and households 
has remained low, while credit standards have tightened slightly again
The	 IBEX-35	 has	 gained	 6.7%	 in	 Q2	 to	 date,	 while	 on	 the	 sovereign	 debt	
market	the	Spanish	10-year	risk	premium	has	barely	moved. Rising banking 
sector stock prices, in particular, have driven these gains in Spain, which outpace 
the increase of some 4.5% in the EURO STOXX 50, against a generally improved 
backdrop for both the macroeconomic outlook and the course of the pandemic. 
On the sovereign and corporate debt markets, long-term bond yields have risen in 
the quarter, in keeping with the pattern observed in the other euro area markets. 
Thus, for example, in the quarter to date, the Spanish 10-year bond yield has risen 
by 10 bp, to 0.44%, with no major change in the risk premium vis-à-vis its German 
equivalent.
The	cost	 of	 bank	 loans	 to	 households	 and	non-financial	 corporations	has	
remained	 low,	 albeit	 with	 some	 slight	 upticks	 in	 certain	 segments,	 while	
credit	 standards	 have	 continued	 to	 tighten.	 In recent months, interest rates 
have risen on new lending to firms over €1 million, consumer credit and lending to 
sole proprietors. By contrast, in all other segments the cost of bank loans has 
barely changed (see Chart 8.1). According to the BLS, credit standards tightened 
slightly in 2021 Q1, owing to lenders’ increased risk perception. Moreover, banks 
expected this pattern to continue in all segments in Q2 (see Chart 8.2). In keeping 
with these developments, the Survey on the Access to Finance of Enterprises 
(SAFE) in the euro area shows that, between October 2020 and March 2021, the 
proportion of Spanish SMEs that had experienced difficulties obtaining bank 
finance increased (see Box 4).
The health crisis worsened in late 2020 and early 2021, giving rise to a 
tightening of the pandemic containment measures, which resulted in a 
downturn in economic activity in Spain in the first quarter
GDP	 fell	 by	 0.5%	 in	 Spain	 in	 2021  Q1,	 after	 a	 sluggish	 performance	 in	
2020  Q4. This contraction was slightly more pronounced than that envisaged 
under the baseline scenario of the Banco de España’s March projection exercise 
(a fall of 0.4%)6 and was essentially due to the adverse course of the pandemic in 
6 See Box  1, “Macroeconomic projections in Spain (2021-2023)”, in the “Quarterly Report on the Spanish 
economy”, Economic Bulletin 1/2021, Banco de España.
4 THE SPANISH ECONOMY
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late 2020 and early 2021. In particular, the worsening of the health crisis led to a 
tightening of certain restrictions on mobility and economic activity, among other 
adverse effects, which had a negative impact on output growth. Consequently, in 
2021 Q1, Spanish GDP was 9.4% below the end-2019 figure, a substantially wider 
gap than that observed in the euro area (around 5.1%) (see Charts 9.1 and 9.2).
The	fall	 in	GDP	mainly	reflected	the	decline	in	private	consumption	and	in	
investment	in	construction,	while	among	the	different	branches	of	economic	
activity	 cross-sectoral	 heterogeneity	 remained	 high.	 Of the main GDP 
components on the demand side, only government consumption, along with 
investment in capital goods and in intangible fixed assets, showed positive growth 
rates (see Chart 9.3). In addition, to the extent that exports contracted much less 
markedly than imports, net external demand also made a positive contribution to 
growth in Q1, while on the supply side, only the primary sector and general 
government, education and health care recorded higher value-added than before 
the start of the health crisis. By contrast, in the services sectors most affected by 
In recent months, interest rates on new lending have remained low, although there has been a slight uptick in some segments. On the debt 
markets, the average cost of issuance of non-financial corporations’ long-term debt securities has risen by some 30 bp since the start of the 
year, in keeping with the increase in long-term sovereign bond yields. According to the BLS, credit standards tightened slightly again overall 
in 2021 Q1. Lenders expected this tightening to continue in Q2.
THE COST OF BANK BORROWING HAS REMAINED LOW, WHILE CREDIT STANDARDS HAVE TIGHTENED SLIGHTLY AGAIN
Chart 8
SOURCES: Refinitiv Datastream and Banco de España.
a Bank lending rates are NDERs (narrowly defined effective rates), i.e. they exclude related charges, such as repayment insurance premiums 
and fees. They are also trend-cycle interest rates, i.e. they are adjusted for seasonal and irregular components (small changes in the series 
with no recognisable pattern in terms of periodicity or trend).
b Indicator = percentage of banks that have tightened their standards considerably × 1 + percentage of banks that have tightened their 
standards somewhat × 1/2 – percentage of banks that have eased their credit standards somewhat × 1/2 – percentage of banks that 
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the pandemic – retail, transport and hospitality, and arts and recreation – activity 
levels remained between 20% and 30% below those recorded at end-2019 (see 
Chart 9.4).
The gradual improvement in the epidemiological situation and the progress 
made in the vaccination campaign have driven the economic recovery in Q2
The health crisis worsened in late 2020 and early 2021; this led to a tightening of the pandemic containment measures, which resulted in a 
fall in Spanish GDP in Q1. This contraction (0.5%) was slightly more pronounced than that envisaged under the baseline scenario of the 
Banco de España’s March projection exercise (a fall of 0.4%), and than the decline in GDP in the euro area overall in the same period (a fall 
of 0.3%). The drop in Spanish GDP in the quarter mainly reflected the decline in private consumption and in investment in construction, while 
among the different branches of economic activity cross-sectoral heterogeneity remained high.
ECONOMIC ACTIVITY CONTRACTED IN 2021 Q1
Chart 9
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4  GROSS VALUE ADDED, BY ECONOMIC ACTIVITY, IN 2021 Q1




























































































































































































eased.	This diagnosis is based, in particular, on the improvement perceived in 
recent months across a wide range of indicators, especially employment and 
survey indicators and various high-frequency indicators that provide key information 
on, for example, electricity demand, card payments and mobility (see Charts 10.2 
to 10.4). In addition, drawing on information obtained essentially in the first half of 
The economic recovery has steadily gained traction in Q2, as the pandemic has taken a more favourable course, the immunisation 
programme has progressed and various restrictions have gradually been eased. In this respect, a clear improvement has been perceived in 
recent months in various high-frequency indicators, for example on electricity demand, card payments and mobility.
THE IMPROVEMENT IN THE HEALTH SITUATION AND THE PROGRESS MADE IN THE VACCINATION CAMPAIGN HAVE 
DRIVEN THE ECONOMIC RECOVERY IN Q2
Chart 10
SOURCES: Ministerio de Sanidad, Google, Dirección de Estudios de Repsol, Red Eléctrica de España and Banco de España.
















































































































3  LOCAL MOBILITY INDICATORS. RETAIL AND RECREATION 
OUTLETS, TRANSIT STATIONS AND WORKPLACES
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DATA ADJUSTED FOR CLIMATE AND WORKING DAYS (CUMULATIVE MONTHLY FIGURE)
2  ELECTRICITY DEMAND
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May, the Banco de España Business Activity Survey (EBAE) suggests that business 
turnover will perform well in Q2.7 
The	 Banco	 de	 España’s	 latest	 projections	 suggest	 that	 GDP	 could	 grow	
significantly	in	Q2.8 Indeed, under the baseline scenario, GDP would grow by 2.2% 
between April and June, primarily on account of domestic demand expansion. However, 
considering that the information available to date on economic activity in the quarter 
overall is limited, and in view of the difficulties observed since the onset of the pandemic 
for the short-term forecasting models to correctly translate the information available 
into output growth, this projection exercise also considers two alternative scenarios.9 
7  See M. Izquierdo (2021), “Encuesta a las empresas españolas sobre la evolución de su actividad (EBAE): 
tercera edición”, Notas Económicas, Banco de España.
8  See Box 1, “Macroeconomic projections for the Spanish economy (2021-2023)”.
9  For an analysis of the importance of the cut-off date of projection exercises for the accuracy of GDP growth 
forecasts in the short term, see Box 5, “Accuracy of short-term economic projections during the pandemic: 
the importance of the cut-off date”. 
Actual social security registrations in May were 4.4% down on their pre-pandemic levels, a clear improvement on the average 6.4% gap 
observed in 2021 Q1. By sector, although employment in the hospitality sector and arts and recreation services has improved in recent 
months, it is still very far from the levels recorded before the onset of the pandemic.
EMPLOYMENT HAS SHOWN CONSIDERABLE BUOYANCY IN RECENT MONTHS
Chart 11
SOURCE: Ministerio de Inclusión, Seguridad Social y Migraciones.
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Employment has shown considerable buoyancy during the second quarter 
Following	 the	decline	observed	at	 the	start	of	 the	year,	actual	social	security	
registrations	have	increased	significantly	in	recent	months. Specifically, in May, 
total social security registrations rose by almost 212,000 persons (a very similar increase 
to that of May 2019), and the number of workers on furlough fell again, to 573,500 on 
average for the month. Thus, actual social security registrations in May were 4.4% 
down on their pre-pandemic levels, a clear improvement on the average 6.4% gap 
observed in 2021 Q1 (see Chart 11.1). In any event, employment growth remains highly 
uneven across sectors, with some, such as the hospitality sector and arts and recreation 
services still far from the employment levels of February 2020, while others, such as the 
information and communication, education, healthcare and general government 
sectors, have already exceeded them (see Chart 11.2).
These	developments	 in	employment	would	be	consistent	with	a	 rise	 in	 the	
hours	worked	in	Q2,	and	with	a	fall	in	the	unemployment	rate. Specifically, the 
total number of hours worked, which declined by 2% in Q1, will foreseeably increase 
again in Q2, in line with the expected rebound in economic activity. According to 
the baseline scenario of the projections exercise, the rate of unemployment would 
decrease from 16% in Q1 to around 15.5% in Q2, in a setting in which the participation 
rate would also recover.
The gradual easing of the pandemic containment measures, the speeding up of the vaccination campaign and the improvement observed 
in the labour market appear to have recently contributed to greater buoyancy of private consumption. This may be inferred, for example, 
from the developments in payment card spending and consumer confidence in recent months. Nevertheless, despite the recovery of 
consumption, the household saving rate appears to have remained relatively high.
HOUSEHOLD CONSUMPTION APPEARS TO HAVE PICKED UP IN 2021 Q2
Chart 12
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consumption.	This may be inferred, for example, from the recent developments in 
payment card spending, consumer confidence and consumer credit (see Charts 12 
and 13.1). All of this would also be consistent with a fall in Q2 in the household 
saving rate, which nevertheless remains relatively high. In recent months, households 
appear to have continued accumulating liquid assets, such as cash and deposits, 
albeit at a slower pace than in previous quarters, thus increasing their wealth, which 
has also been boosted by the increase in the value of equities and, to a lesser 
extent, the growth in real estate wealth.
Housing	 investment	 is	 estimated	 to	 have	 risen	 slightly	 in	Q2.	 In Q1, housing 
investment contracted by 2.9% on the previous quarter, partly as a result of the 
adverse effects that the extreme weather conditions affecting some regions during 
much of January had on construction activity and perhaps also on house purchases. 
In the case of households, the outstanding amounts of loans for house purchase and consumption has shown greater, albeit relatively 
contained, dynamism in recent months. By contrast, the rate of growth of corporate financing from banks and through the capital markets 
has moderated recently, while the outstanding amounts of loans to sole proprietors has continued to decline.
IN RECENT MONTHS, HOUSEHOLD LENDING HAS STOPPED CONTRACTING, WHILE FINANCING TO FIRMS HAS 
LOST MOMENTUM
Chart 13
SOURCE: Banco de España.
a Seasonally adjusted rates.
b Excludes securitised lending.
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The volume of house purchases from January to March was 3.5% lower than in the 
same period of 2019, with notable heterogeneity across different types of housing 
(see Charts 14.1 and 14.2). The slowdown of housing investment appears to have 
been transitory, according to some recent indicators which approximate developments 
in residential construction (such as the apparent consumption of cement and social 
security registrations in the residential construction sub-sector), and this demand 
component seems to have recovered in recent months (see Chart 14.3). Moreover, 
According to some indicators, such as the apparent consumption of cement and social security registrations in the residential construction 
sub-sector, housing investment seems to have recovered in recent months, after contracting in 2021 Q1, partly as a result of the adverse 
effects that the extreme weather conditions affecting some regions at the beginning of the year had on construction activity and perhaps also 
on house purchases. In any event, these developments would be consistent with the gradual deceleration in house prices observed since 
2018 H2, especially for second-hand homes.
HOUSING INVESTMENT IS ESTIMATED TO HAVE RISEN SLIGHTLY IN Q2
Chart 14
SOURCES: Banco de España, Centro de Información Estadística del Notariado, INE and Ministerio de Trabajo y Economía Social.
a The percentage shown in the chart refers to the decline in housing sales in 2021 Q1 versus 2019 Q1.
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the outstanding amounts of loans for house purchase has shown greater dynamism 
in recent months, growing slightly in quarter-on-quarter terms (see Chart 13.1). The 
gradual deceleration in house prices observed since 2018 H2 continued and was 
particularly pronounced in second-hand homes. The year-on-year rate of the house 
price index published by the National Statistics Institute (INE) moderated to 0.9% in 
2021 Q1, 0.6 pp down on the previous quarter (see Chart 14.4). 
Business	investment	continued	to	grow	in	early	Q2. Examples of indicators pointing 
in this direction are the composite activity PMI, which has been in expansionary territory 
since March, and the European Commission’s confidence indicators, which have 
shown a strong recovery in recent months, both for industry and services. In addition, 
the industrial production expectations rebounded strongly to April, while in Q2 the 
indicator approximating the industrial order book has reached higher values than those 
posted before the onset of the health crisis (see Chart 15.1). All this in a setting in which 
the share of industrial firms that mention the lack of installed equipment as one of the 
factors limiting production has reached a record high in Q2 (see Chart 15.2).
However, financing to firms and sole proprietors has recently lost some of its 
momentum, largely as a result of the high liquidity buffers they built up in 2020. 
The confidence indicators that provide key information about developments in investment in capital goods and in intangible assets suggest 
that the demand component would grow between April and June. Thus, for example, the industrial production expectations stand at very 
high levels within the historical series, while in Q2 the industrial order book exceeds the values posted before the onset of the health crisis. 
The proportion of industrial firms that mention the lack of installed equipment as one of the factors limiting production has reached a record 
high in Q2.
BUSINESS INVESTMENT IS EXPECTED TO CONTINUE TO GROW IN Q2
Chart 15
SOURCE: European Commission.
a Standardised data. Series computed by subtracting the average and dividing by the standard deviation.
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Thus, in April, the outstanding amounts of loans extended by resident financial 
institutions to firms contracted by 0.3% quarter-on-quarter, the rate of growth of 
corporate financing raised through the issuance of fixed-income securities slowed 
to 2% quarter-on-quarter and the outstanding balance of lending to sole proprietors 
declined further (see Chart 13). The corporate sector’s debt ratio increased again 
in 2021 Q1, mainly owing to the fall in GDP, since the volume of corporate debt 
remained relatively stable. Moreover, the debt burden ratio in terms of GDP has 
also risen recently, albeit moderately, owing to the low costs of debt.
Foreign trade is expected to resume its recovery path in Q2, although how 
travel receipts will evolve continues to be subject to significant uncertainty 
The	 performance	 of	 new	 export	 orders	 and	 inputs	 purchases	 in	 the	
manufacturing	PMI	suggests	that	goods	exports	and	imports	grew	in	April-
June (see Chart 16.1). Nevertheless, the supply problems that have recently been 
observed for some inputs appear to have limited the recovery of these trade flows, 
especially in those industries that are more integrated into global value chains, 
such as the car industry. Meanwhile, on the information available to date, the 
Brexit-related distortions to Spanish goods exports to the United Kingdom in late 
2020 and early 2021 appear to have been essentially temporary (see Chart 16.2).
Manufacturing-sector survey indicators anticipate that foreign goods trade will be clearly favourable in Q2, while the available foreign tourism 
indicators remain far below their pre-pandemic levels. Meanwhile, Brexit does not seem to have so far had a significant impact on Spanish 
goods exports to the United Kingdom, besides some essentially temporary distortions in late 2020 and early 2021.
FOREIGN TRADE IS EXPECTED TO RECOVER
Chart 16


























































































































































































































PMI: NEW EXPORT ORDERS. MANUFACTURING
PMI: NEW EXPORT ORDERS. SERVICES
PMI: VOLUME OF PURCHASES SPAIN (MANUFACTURING)
1  PURCHASING MANAGERS' INDICES












TOTAL EXPORTS EXPORTS TO THE UNITED KINGDOM
%
2  NOMINAL EXPORTS OF SPANISH GOODS
Year-on-year rates
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 63 ECONOMIC BULLETIN 2/2021  QUARTERLY REPORT ON THE SPANISH ECONOMY
The	outlook	 for	 the	summer	 tourism	season	continues	 to	be	surrounded	by	
very	high	uncertainty.	To April (the latest available figure), arrivals of foreign tourists 
and their spending in Spain remained very low, around 90% down on the levels 
observed in the same period in 2019. The potential strength of their recovery over the 
coming weeks and during the summer will hinge on the course of the pandemic, the 
restrictions on international travel imposed by Spain’s main source markets (especially 
the United Kingdom) and the effective roll-out of the EU Digital COVID Certificate.
The Government published the Recovery, Transformation and Resilience Plan 
and the Stability Programme Update 2021-2024
In	2021 Q1,	the	general	government	deficit	increased	once	more.	Specifically, 
excluding local government, the budget deficit rose to 1.3% of GDP, compared with 
0.9% and 0.3% of GDP in the same period in 2020 and 2019, respectively (see 
Chart 17.1). This was chiefly due to the increase in public spending, while general 
government revenue, benefitting from the measures deployed to sustain household 
In 2021 Q1, the budget deficit, excluding local government, rose to 1.3% of GDP, higher than the figures posted in the same period in 2020 
and 2019. This was chiefly due to the increase in public spending, while general government revenue appears to have already returned to 
levels similar to those observed before the pandemic.
IN 2021 Q1, THE GENERAL GOVERNMENT DEFICIT INCREASED ONCE MORE
Chart 17
SOURCES: Banco de España, IGAE and Stability Programme 2021-2024 (April 2021).
a The IGAE only provides quarterly information on general government as a whole. It publishes the data on the total, excluding local 
government, on a monthly basis.
b Baseline scenario of the macroeconomic projections for the Spanish economy published in June.
c Relating to the aggregate for general government, excluding local government and transfers within general government. Corrected for the 
temporary impact of the reversion of several motorway concessions to the State in January 2020 and the reclassification of Sareb under 
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income, appears to have already returned to levels similar to those observed before 
the pandemic (see Chart 17.2). 
On	 30  April,	 the	 Government	 submitted	 to	 the	 European	 authorities	 the	
Recovery,	 Transformation	 and	 Resilience	 Plan	 (RTRP)	 and	 the	 Stability	
Programme	 Update	 2021-2024	 (SPU).	 The Government estimates that the 
resources obtained in the form of grants through the Recovery and Resilience 
Facility (RRF) and REACT-EU will allow for additional investment of over 2 pp of 
GDP on average in the period 2021-2023. Nevertheless, there is a high level of 
uncertainty about the capacity to absorb these funds and the pace of their 
Headline inflation has continued to rise in Spain in recent months — somewhat more steeply than in the euro area as a whole — mainly on 
account of the acceleration of energy prices, in part owing to a significant base effect stemming from the decline in these prices in the spring 
of 2020. Meanwhile, tourism-related prices continued to show a much more moderate behaviour than usual.
INCREASE IN INFLATION STEMMING MAINLY FROM RISING ENERGY PRICES
Chart 18
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absorption. Meanwhile, the SPU envisages that fiscal policy will be expansionary 
in 2021 and neutral in the period 2022-2024.10
In	 late	 May,	 the	 Government	 also	 approved	 a	 further	 extension	 to	 the	
employment	 protection	 measures	 for	 furloughed	 workers	 and	 the	 self-
employed	who	have	suspended	their	activity.11 The extension was approved until 
end-September of this year and maintains similar conditions to those applicable 
since the measures were last renewed. However, it also includes incentives for the 
return of furloughed workers, comprising a waiver of between 85% and 95% of 
social security contributions in the sectors hardest hit by the pandemic.
Headline inflation has continued to rise in recent months owing mainly to energy 
prices, as there is still no discernible significant upward pressure on core inflation 
In	May,	the	year-on-year	growth	rate	of	the	HICP	rose	to	2.4%,	prolonging	the	
pick-up	 observed	 in	 headline	 inflation	 since	 late	 2020 (see Chart  18.1). This 
progressive increase in prices, which has been somewhat sharper than that observed in 
the euro area as a whole (see Chart 18.2), mainly reflects the increase in the growth rate 
of energy prices – electricity and also heating and vehicle fuel prices – in recent months. 
This acceleration is in turn largely attributable to the base effect associated with the 
sharp decline in these prices in 2020 following the outbreak of the pandemic (see 
Chart 18.3). Consequently, the impact of this component is likely to be temporary, with 
the result that headline inflation is expected to fall back below 2% after a few months.
In	contrast,	core	inflation	(HICP	excluding	energy	and	food)	has	remained	at	
very	low	levels	and	is	expected	to	increase	only	very	gradually	over	the	coming	
quarters.	Specifically, core inflation fell to -0.3% in April owing to the deceleration of 
services prices, in a setting in which tourism-related items continued to lose pace 
and any possible Easter-related effect was obscured by the impact of the strict spring 
2020 lockdown on this item. Nevertheless, core inflation is expected to quicken 
slightly in the second half of the year. Indeed, the trajectory of tourism and leisure-
related prices (following the correction of the base effect stemming from the decline 
observed in this component in mid-2020) and the gradual recovery projected for 
activity in these sectors should contribute to this acceleration (see Chart 18.4). 
Cut-off date: 8.6.2021. 
Publication date: 14.6.2021.
10  According to the SPU, the budget deficit is expected to decrease by 2.6 pp to 8.4% of GDP in 2021 and to 
continue to decline gradually over the rest of the period considered, to stand at 3.2% of GDP in 2024. This 
reduction is expected to stem chiefly from the disappearance of the support measures introduced to tackle 
the COVID-19 crisis and from the cyclical recovery of GDP. In any event, according to this programme, the 
Spanish economy’s structural budget deficit and public debt ratio will still stand at 4.2% and 112.1% of GDP 
in 2024, respectively, in both cases well above their pre-pandemic levels.
11  See Royal Decree-Law 11/2021 of 27 May 2021.
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Chronology of published Analytical Articles corresponding to this Economic Bulletin.
THE BALANCE OF PAYMENTS AND INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT POSITION 
OF SPAIN IN 2020
Laura Álvarez, Pana Alves, Esther López and César Martín
Published on 3 June 2021
In 2020, the Spanish economy recorded net lending of 1.1% of GDP, significantly 
below the previous year’s level of 2.5%. This decline essentially reflects the impact 
of the health crisis on travel credits, which contracted sharply, owing to the restrictions 
on international mobility and on activity in accommodation and food and travel 
services to contain the pandemic. The widening of the secondary income deficit 
also contributed to the decline in net lending, albeit to a much lesser extent. These 
developments offset the improvement in the other components, which was 
particularly notable in the goods and primary income balances. Cross-border 
financial transactions were strongly influenced by the increase in the volume of 
Eurosystem asset purchases, as reflected by a large surplus on the financial account 
of resident sectors, excluding the Banco de España. By contrast, the financial 
transactions of the Banco de España with the rest of the world showed a large 
increase in its liabilities. Spain’s negative net international investment position 
increased to 84.3% of GDP, essentially as a result of the sharp fall in GDP and the 
decline in the value of external financial assets owing to the appreciation of the euro. 
Finally, in terms of GDP, the nation’s gross external debt stood at all-time highs 
(199.4%) owing to the contraction in economic activity and the assumption of new 
liabilities, in particular by the Banco de España, given the increase in its positions 
vis-à-vis the Eurosystem as a result of the implementation of the asset purchase 
programmes.
THE IMPACT OF THE COVID-19 HEALTH CRISIS ON THE HOUSING MARKET IN 
SPAIN
Pana Alves and Lucio San Juan
Published on 11 May 2021
The residential real estate market has been affected by the COVID-19 pandemic, 
which broke out at a time when the cycle of this market was in a mature phase. 
Activity fell off sharply in the early months of the health crisis, owing to the effect of 
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the restrictions adopted. It has since seen a slow recovery and remains highly 
influenced by epidemiological developments and the related impact on agents’ 
economic outlook. The pandemic has triggered manifest changes in the type of 
housing in demand, attributable to households’ new needs arising from the lockdown 
and increased remote working. As compared with other crises, prices are showing 
greater downward rigidity, particularly in the case of new housing, although the 
impact of the pandemic is proving highly uneven across regions. The pandemic-
induced economic crisis has not driven up the cost of financing for house purchase 
which has continued to decline to record lows. Nevertheless, there are some signs 
of a tightening of credit standards and of some of the terms and conditions applied 
to loans.
FISCAL REBALANCING PLANS IN THE MEDIUM TERM: THE CASE OF THE 
UNITED KINGDOM
Júlia Brunet and Susana Párraga
Published on 6 May 2021
The extraordinary fiscal policy response to mitigate the strong economic impact of 
the COVID-19 pandemic has pushed public debt notably higher, exceeding its peak 
levels of the last five decades in the main advanced economies. Additionally, support 
for the economic recovery will foreseeably require maintaining a sizeable fiscal 
impulse in the short term. In this setting, announcing medium-term plans to rebalance 
public finances would be suitable, according to the studies available. These plans 
recoup the countercyclical room for manoeuvre of fiscal policy, as well as anchor 
economic agents’ expectations and reduce the potential risks of high government 
indebtedness for future economic activity. This article describes the example of the 
United Kingdom, the first country to propose a gradual fiscal adjustment programme 
for the medium term, while maintaining public support for the economic recovery in 
the short term.
REPORT ON THE LATIN AMERICAN ECONOMY. FIRST HALF OF 2021. 
OUTLOOK, VULNERABILITIES AND POLICY SPACE
International Economics and Euro Area Department
Published on 28 April 2021
The economic recovery in Latin America continued into the first part of this year, but 
lost momentum owing to the adverse course of the pandemic. Against this macro-
financial backdrop, the region’s banking systems remain healthy, although some 
indicators, such as bank profitability, have started to feel the effects of the persistence 
of the crisis. The strength of the recovery will be chiefly determined by the course of 
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the pandemic, in particular by how fast the vaccine is rolled out and its effectiveness. 
It will also hinge on the momentum of foreign demand and commodity prices, the 
resolution of potential social tensions in the region, global financial conditions, the 
degree of support from economic policies, whose headroom has narrowed, and 
regional and global economic safety nets. Given the high level of uncertainty 
surrounding the economic outlook, the report presents alternative scenarios relating 
to a series of epidemiological, economic and financial variables. However, it should 
be noted that, broadly speaking, the region has fewer structural vulnerabilities now 
than in previous episodes of turmoil. In any event, the complex economic situation 
reinforces the need for institutional and economic reform agendas that address the 
region’s structural problems.
INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL MARKETS DURING THE COVID-19 CRISIS
Laura Álvarez, Alberto Fuertes, Luis Molina and Emilio Muñoz de la Peña
Published on 21 April 2021
This article analyses the main trends in securities issuance activity on international 
markets in 2020, a year in which capital markets were very buoyant despite the 
COVID-19 crisis. In 2020, record figures were posted for issues on fixed-income 
markets globally, driven by the measures adopted by governments and central banks 
to smooth financing and foment market liquidity. In terms of sectors, issuance by the 
public sector and non-financial corporations increased, while there were declines in 
the banking sector. By region, increases in issuance volumes were across the board, 
with notably greater dynamism in the United States and the United Kingdom. Finally, 
as regards time horizon, there was a strong increase in the second quarter of the 
year, with record figures posted. This may have been due to the fact that many 
issuers attempted to bring forward their issues in that quarter given the enormous 
uncertainty over the course of the pandemic and future financing conditions. Equity 
market issues were also notably buoyant, with figures not recorded since 2009.
APRIL 2021 BANK LENDING SURVEY IN SPAIN
Álvaro Menéndez Pujadas and Maristela Mulino
Published on 20 April 2021
According to the Bank Lending Survey, during 2021 Q1 the loan supply contracted 
slightly once again in almost all segments both in Spain and in the euro area, which 
is linked to banks’ heightened risk perceptions. Loan applications slipped across the 
board in the two areas. Banks consider that monetary policy measures generally 
continued to contribute to improving their financial situation and prompted an easing 
of the terms and conditions on new loans and an increase in lending volumes.
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FURLOUGH SCHEMES IN THE COVID-19 CRISIS: AN INITIAL ANALYSIS OF 
FURLOUGHED EMPLOYEES RESUMING WORK
Mario Izquierdo, Sergio Puente and Ana Regil
Published on 30 March 2021
This article uses microdata from the Spanish Labour Force Survey (EPA) to conduct 
an initial analysis of the use of furlough schemes as a temporary employment 
adjustment mechanism in this crisis. The information drawn from the survey shows 
there has been an intensive use of furlough schemes since the COVID-19 crisis 
broke, with more than 20% of dependent employees furloughed in 2020 Q2. This is 
far higher than the incidence observed in previous recessions. Analysis of the 
employment transitions of furloughed workers shows that they were much more 
likely to resume employment in Q3 than workers who lost their jobs but were not 
furloughed. These schemes have, therefore, been highly effective in allowing workers 
to resume work once the lockdown measures adopted in spring 2020 were lifted. 
However, considering the furlough schemes that began in Q3 and those that were 
longer-lasting, there is less difference between furloughed and non-furloughed 
workers in terms of the probability of their resuming work. This essentially reflects 
the ongoing low level of activity associated with the continuation of the pandemic-
related restrictions.
RESULTS OF NON-FINANCIAL CORPORATIONS TO 2020 Q4. PRELIMINARY 
YEAR-END DATA
Álvaro Menéndez Pujadas and Maristela Mulino
Published on 26 March 2021
The COVID-19 crisis has significantly impacted firms’ economic and financial 
performance. Thus, the Central Balance Sheet Data Office Quarterly Survey 
evidences that in 2020 the ordinary earnings and average profitability of the firms of 
this sample fell sharply. While profitability worsened across the board, in some 
sectors, such as industry, wholesale and retail trade and hospitality, and information 
and communication, the deterioration was particularly severe. Further, extraordinary 
earnings performed particularly negatively, resulting in a sharp drop in net profit. 
Financial positions have also been dented; the average debt and debt burden ratios 
both increased. In light of greater uncertainty, firms increased their liquidity buffers 
as a precautionary measure. The article contains a box that concludes that the 
increased financial pressure borne by some firms seems to bear a greater relation to 
the drop in ordinary earnings than to the rise in debt, which, overall, appears to have 
been moderate for the sample firms.
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PERSONAL LOAN RATES AND HOUSEHOLD CHARACTERISTICS: SPAIN 
COMPARED WITH OTHER EURO AREA COUNTRIES
Cristina Barceló, Ernesto Villanueva and Elena Vozmediano
Published on 25 March 2021
Interest rates on new lending to households for purposes other than house purchase 
are generally higher in Spain than in other euro area countries. This may be because 
borrowers have different characteristics, or because Spanish households pay higher 
interest rates than similar households in other countries, owing to regulatory aspects, 
different competition levels or other factors.
Data from the Eurosystem’s Household Finance and Consumption Survey, which 
compiles data on household wealth, debts and income in each euro area country, 
show that borrowers in Spain have fewer assets and are more likely to be unemployed 
than those in the other countries analysed. However, these differences between 
borrowers explain only a small part of the difference between Spanish personal loan 
rates and those applied in the other euro area countries. In consequence, most of 
the difference is due to the different way in which Spanish financial institutions 
assess household characteristics. One possible explanation for the higher interest 
rates in Spain is that, even when comparing employed persons with similar 
characteristics, Spanish households have a higher risk of job loss than German and 
French households and, for the same income level, greater income instability than 
German households. The survey data also show that Spanish indebted households 
that pay higher interest rates are also more likely subsequently to fall behind in their 
debt payments and to experience income declines. In Spain, therefore, high interest 
rates reflect this greater future income instability.
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ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS
COUNTRIES AND CURRENCIES
In accordance with the protocol order, the EU Member States are listed 
using the alphabetical order of the country names in the national languages.
BE Belgium EUR (euro)
BG Bulgaria BGN (Bulgarian lev)
CZ Czech Republic CZK (Czech koruna)
DK Denmark DKK (Danish krone)
DE Germany EUR (euro)
EE Estonia EUR (euro)
IE Ireland EUR (euro)
GR Greece EUR (euro)
ES Spain EUR (euro)
FR France EUR (euro)
IT Italy EUR (euro)
HR Croatia HRK (Croatian kuna)
CY Cyprus EUR (euro)
LV Latvia EUR (euro)
LT Lithuania EUR (euro)
LU Luxembourg EUR (euro)
HU Hungary HUF (Hungarian forint)
MT Malta EUR (euro)
NL Netherlands EUR (euro)
AT Austria EUR (euro)
PL Poland PLN (Polish zloty)
PT Portugal EUR (euro)
RO Romania RON (New Romanian leu)
SI Slovenia EUR (euro)
SK Slovakia EUR (euro)
FI Finland EUR (euro)
SE Sweden SEK (Swedish krona)
UK United Kingdom GBP (Pound sterling)
JP Japan JPY (Japanese yen)
US United States USD (US dollar)
AIReF Independent Authority for Fiscal Responsibility
AMCESFI Spanish macroprudential authority
APP Asset Purchase Programme
BCBS Basel Committee on Banking Supervision
BE Banco de España
BIS Bank for International Settlements
BLS Bank Lending Survey
BOP Balance of Payments
CBA CBSO Annual Survey
CBI Integrated CBSO Annual Survey 
CBQ CBSO Quarterly Survey
CBSO Central Balance Sheet Data Office
CCR Central Credit Register
CDSs Credit default swaps
CNE Spanish National Accounts
CNMV National Securities Market Commission
COVID-19 Coronavirus disease 2019 
CPI Consumer Price Index
CSPP Corporate sector purchase programme
DGF Deposit Guarantee Fund
EBA European Banking Authority
EC European Commission 
ECB European Central Bank
ECOFIN Council of the European Communities (Economic and 
Financial Affairs)
EDP Excessive Deficit Procedure
EFB European Fiscal Board
EFF Spanish Survey of Household Finances
EFSF European Financial Stability Facility
EMU Economic and Monetary Union
EONIA Euro overnight index average
EPA Official Spanish Labour Force Survey
ESA 2010 European System of National and Regional Accounts
ESCB European System of Central Banks
ESFS European System of Financial Supervisors
ESM European Stability Mechanism
ESRB European Systemic Risk Board
EU European Union
EURIBOR Euro interbank offered rate
EUROSTAT Statistical Office of the European Communities
FASE Financial Accounts of the Spanish Economy
FDI Foreign direct investment
FOMC Federal Open Market Committee
FSB Financial Stability Board
FSF Financial Stability Forum
GDI Gross disposable income
GDP Gross domestic product
GFCF Gross fixed capital formation
GNP Gross national product
GOP Gross operating profit
GVA Gross value added
HICP Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices
IASB International Accounting Standards Board 
ICO Official Credit Institute 
IFRSs International Financial Reporting Standards
IIP International Investment Position
IMF International Monetary Fund
INE National Statistics Institute
LTROs Longer-term refinancing operations
MFIs Monetary financial institutions
MREL Minimum requirement for own funds and eligible liabilities
MROs Main refinancing operations
MTBDE Banco de España quarterly macroeconomic model
NAFTA North American Free Trade Agreement
NCBs National central banks
NFCs Non-financial corporations
NPISHs Non-profit institutions serving households
OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
ONP Ordinary net profit
OPEC Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries
PEPP Pandemic Emergency Purchase Programme
PER Price/earnings ratio
PMI Purchasing Managers’ Index
PPP Purchasing power parity
QNA Quarterly National Accounts
SDRs Special Drawing Rights
SEPA Single Euro Payments Area
SGP Stability and Growth Pact
SMEs Small and medium-sized enterprises
SRM Single Resolution Mechanism
SSM Single Supervisory Mechanism
TFP Total factor productivity
TLTROs Targeted longer-tem refinancing operations
ULCs Unit labour costs
VAT Value Added Tax
WTO World Trade Organization
CONVENTIONS USED
M1 Notes and coins held by the public + sight deposits.
M2 M1 + deposits redeemable at notice of up to three months + 
deposits with an agreed maturity of up to two years.
M3 M2 + repos + shares in money market funds and money 
market instruments + debt securities issued with an agreed 
maturity of up to two years.
Q1, Q4 Calendar quarters.






— Nil, non-existence of the event considered or insignificance 
of changes when expressed as rates of growth.
0.0 Less than half the final digit shown in the series.
